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This Article is a comparative analysis of insider trading law in the United
States and Chile. The study summarily reviews the historical, political, and
legal foundations of insider trading regulation in both jurisdictions, identi-
fying areas of convergence, as well as areas in which the Chilean securities
market could benefit vis-a`-vis the more advanced experience of the consid-
erably larger American securities market. The Article also highlights the
axiological closeness between both jurisdictions concerning the protection
of inside corporate information and the fiduciary role of those who inter-
vene in securities markets in their various capacities (as investors, share-
holders, corporate officers, consultants, advisors, or as other intermediary
roles). The Article concludes by identifying a series of reforms that might
potentially benefit the Chilean legal system as it works towards its stated
purpose of protecting and promoting transparency in its national securities
market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of “insider trading,” also called the “use of privileged infor-
mation,” is perhaps one of the most complex and highly debated in corpo-
rate law, both in the United States and in Chile. The constant growth of
diverse corporate, business, and entrepreneurial organizations in both
countries has taken place in tandem with a growing web of legislative, ad-
ministrative, and self-regulatory insider trading measures. These develop-
ments have also resulted in increased private litigation by parties seeking
insider-trading-related damages. Chile’s openness to international markets
will likely motivate continued growth in the field of insider trading, as has
occurred in the United States at least since the late 1980s. Thus, there is a
benefit of – and a need for – undertaking an updated comparative study of
the problem of insider trading in both jurisdictions.
The current Chilean corporate structure is an “insider”1 system, in
which equity ownership of stock corporations is highly concentrated;2 that
is, a few corporate groups control the majority of companies.3 This reality
explains the perceived risk of oppression of minority shareholders.4 De-
spite this, during the last two decades, Chile has witnessed an enormous
inflow of foreign investment.5 Furthermore, many Chilean corporations
are also closely controlled by specific families that play a major role in the
country’s economic organization.6
This Article identifies the current Chilean regulations on the “use of
privileged information” as one of the most important corporate govern-
1. Manuel R. Agosin & Ernesto H. Paste´n, Corporate Governance in Chile 1 (Central
Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 209, 2003).
2. Matı´as Zegers Ruiz-Tagle & Ignacio Arteaga Echeverrı´a, Intere´s Social, Deber de
Lealtad de los Directores y Conflictos de Intere´s en Empresas Multinacionales: Un Ana´lisis
Comparado con la Legislacio´n de Los Estados Unidos de Ame´rica, 31 REVISTA CHILENA DE
DECHERO 239, 260 (2004) (referring to the Chilean market as “highly concentrated . . . where
the majority of controlling shareholders in publicly-traded stock corporations hold almost the
totality of the shares issued by such corporations.”).
3. See Agosin & Paste´n, supra note 1, at 3 (“The five largest groups account for 30
per cent [sic] of the market capitalization of the Santiago stock exchange[.]”); id. at 4 (“Al-
most three quarters of the average company’s shares are owned by the three largest
shareholders[.]”).
4. See CLAUDIO ILLANES RI´OS, RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DE LOS DIRECTORES Y
GERENTES DE BANCOS Y SOCIEDADES ANO´NIMAS SEGU´N LEGISLACIO´N PERTINENTE 12
(1993) (indicating that “the social economic function performed by commercial banks, the
whole of their business operations, the credibility and security that the system needs, all of
these factors deserve a delimitation of civil responsibilities beyond the normal requirements,
but that would require a more stringent legislative framework guaranteeing more effectively
the interests of shareholders, of minority shareholders and of shareholders related to the
banking system, through a more precise and clearer legal regulation of the activities deemed
unlawful . . . .”).
5. See Agosin & Paste´n, supra note 1, at abs.
6. Id. at 2.
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ance regulatory regimes in that country.7  The Article advances the thesis
that, even though important legal improvements have recently taken place
in Chile, it is advisable to introduce still greater improvements to these
laws to establish: (i) a clearer and simpler description of forbidden con-
duct; (ii) a more precise determination of who the regulated individuals
and entities are; (iii) a more certain demarcation of the duty of abstention
binding directors of publicly traded stock corporations; and (iv) the exis-
tence of classes of information that are considered to per se influence the
pricing of a company’s stock.
Chilean jurisprudence has addressed many of these topics. As is typical
in civil law countries, case law in Chile does not generally have a stare
decisis effect.8 However, the decisions issued by the highest courts of the
land do typically carry a persuasive force over lower courts.9 At any rate, a
deeper level of legislative harmonization concerning the use of privileged
information in Chile would bring a heightened degree of legal certainty.
This Article presents several proposals in this regard.
This Article reviews insider trading regulation in the United States as a
point of reference that may serve as a guideline for the future evolution of
insider trading regulation in Chile. The particular areas of United States
insider trading regulation assessed are: the basic element of insider trading
responsibility under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities and Exchange Act
(the “1933 Act”);10 Sections 10(b) & 16 and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securi-
ties and Exchange Act (the “1934 Act”),11 particularly the identification of
regulated individuals and entities involved in insider trading or tipping
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act; and Rule 14e-3 of the
1934 Act concerning insider trading or tipping in the context of public
offerings.
This Article is divided into the following sections: Part II analyzes in-
sider trading law in the United States, while Part III presents the historical
background of insider trading in Chile. Next, Part IV focuses on the legis-
lative regulation of insider trading in Chile, and Part V identifies the con-
sequences of violating the obligations towards and prohibitions against
insider trading or the use of privileged information in Chile. In turn, Part
VI explains the most recent and relevant Chilean case law related to the
use of privileged information.  Finally, Part VII proposes potential im-
provements to the legislative framework of insider trading in Chile in the
context of a comparative perspective with the United States system.
7. Teodoro Wigodski & Franco Zu´n˜iga, Gobierno Corporativo en Chile Despue´s de
la Ley de Opas 11 (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.dii.uchile.cl/
~ceges/publicaciones/ceges38.pdf.
8. See generally M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andres
Bello’s Use of the Code Napoleon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291
(2001).
9. Id.
10. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78pp (2012).
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II. INSIDER TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Political-Economic Foundation of Insider Trading Regulation
in the United States
One of the primary purposes of governmental regulation of insider
trading is to eliminate the informational inequality between corporate in-
siders and public investors.12 While the government cannot prevent indi-
vidual members of the public from making poor investment decisions, it
can attempt to ensure that those decisions are as well-informed as possible
by prohibiting individuals with superior knowledge from using information
that is not yet in the public domain. In the United States, the golden rule
concerning the treatment of privileged information is “to not reveal the
information or to abstain from transacting.”13 Securities laws and regula-
tions focus on information or facts related to the value of securities,14 be-
cause insider trading regulation seeks to correct an inadequate
performance of the market system15 through one of its essential elements
– the price of the security.
In effect, the investing public is harmed by insider trading because
once the value of a particular piece of privileged information is used up,
the opportunity for others to profit from that information is gone for-
ever.16 The legislative histories of the various insider trading-related provi-
sions indicate that Congress views insider trading as unfair, unethical, and/
or immoral.17 Indeed, insider trading is considered a predatory practice
that crosses the line between legitimate investment decisions and fraud.18
12. STUART CHARLES GOLDBERG, SEC TRADING RESTRICTIONS AND REPORTING RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR INSIDERS 43 (1973).
13. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455 (2003).
14. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 2.
15. Mauricio D. Amar, Uso de informacio´n privilegiada: La relacio´n entre empresa y
polı´tica en el debate, Serie Estudios N°4, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, Jan. 29,
2007, at 3, available at http://www.bcn.cl/bibliodigital/pbcn/estudios/estudios_pdf_estudios/
nro04-07.pdf (indicating that “[t]he use of privileged information is a source of distortion of
the market[.]”).
16. JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 10
(1991).
17. See generally Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread is the Problem and is There
Adequate Criminal Enforcement? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006) [hereinafter Illegal Insider Trading]; Examining Enforcement of Criminal Insider
Trading and Hedge Fund Activity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006) [hereinafter Criminal Insider Trading]; BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., INSIDER TRADING
AND SECURITIES FRAUD: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURI-
TIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, PUB. L. NO. 100-704 (1989); BERNARD D. REAMS,
JR., INSIDER TRADING AND THE LAW: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INSIDER TRADING
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984, PUB. L. NO. 98-376 (1989). Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 247-48 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that insider trading is “inherently un-
fair” and that the Supreme Court should interpret the securities laws “flexibly” to increase
the fairness of the securities markets), quoted in MACEY, supra note 16, at 23.
18. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 42.
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In a 2006 Congressional testimony concerning the criminal prosecution of
insider trading, Professor John C. Coffee noted that:
Everyone [is injured by insider trading]. . . . As informed traders increase their
trading on the basis of asymmetric information, bid/ask spreads are likely to
widen on all stocks (thus increasing the cost to investors to trade). Ultimately,
insider trading causes the cost of equity capital to rise, and this in turn has a
macro-economic effect on GNP, employment, and the economy as a whole.19
Insider trading can also harm the issuing corporation itself by contami-
nating the incentives and decisions of managers.20 For example, corporate
officers might try to decrease the value of the firm so as to personally
profit from trading on the stock of a rival company. Or, corporate manag-
ers might opt to take an inordinate amount of risk because the resulting
volatility could present an opportunity for insider trading profits.  Trans-
parency and flow of information within the business might, too, be harmed
as insiders seek to protect their privileged positions.21 Even when the em-
ployer of an inside trader is not the issuing corporation, the employer may
nonetheless be harmed. Namely, the employer’s reputation for maintain-
ing clients’ confidences or reporting information objectively is likely to
suffer, potentially causing profits to decrease.22
A property rights perspective represents an alternative viewpoint.
Under this theory, privileged information belongs to the firm, which
should, therefore, be allowed to allocate such privileged information in
order to maximize the welfare of its investors.23 According to this view,
insider trading is neither inherently good nor bad and could benefit both
shareholders and society under certain circumstances.24 For example, Pro-
fessor Jonathan R. Macey argues that, to the extent that insider trading
causes securities markets to be inefficient or illiquid, firms themselves
would ban the practice, making insider trading self-regulated,25 rather
than requiring the devotion of other resources to perform a regulatory
function. Professor Macey’s optimistic approach implies that self-regula-
tion by firms in the area of insider trading would be based on an expecta-
tion that all investors have relatively equal access to material
information.26 However, as even Professor Macey acknowledges, often-
times insiders will be naturally inclined toward generating immediate prof-
19. Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 62  (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School).
20. WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 2.3.2 (3rd. ed.
2010).
21. See id. § 2.3.3.
22. Id.
23. MACEY, supra note 16, at 3.
24. Id. at 70.
25. Id. at 9-10 (according to Professor Macey’s view, the perceived short-term benefits
that a company would derive from insider trading would not be sufficient to justify the per-
manence of insider trading conduct in the long term. Consequently, firms would be naturally
inclined to avoid such conduct without the need of government intervention).
26. Id. at 22.
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its from insider trading. Thus, the insider trading-driven incentive to delay
disclosure of confidential information to the public may not only impede
market efficiency, but render unrealistic the notion of equal access to
information.27
Despite the sometimes dubious intentions of non-disclosure, corporate
secrecy may serve legitimate corporate purposes. Indeed, it is only when
non-public information is improperly used that the anti-fraud provisions of
the 1934 Act are violated.28 In drafting those provisions, Congress in-
tended for the Exchange Act to dispel the notion that use of insider infor-
mation for personal advantage was a legitimate emolument of corporate
office.29 To that extent, insider trading laws are generally believed to have
a positive impact on stock markets.30
In recent decades, U.S. courts have greatly expanded the scope of in-
sider trading-related legislation to include multiple situations that were
not initially foreseen by Congress. Insider trading law now covers the no-
tion of “tipping,” which is the extension of liability to intermediaries, and
even to family members, of those possessing privileged information who
unduly reveal it.31 Additionally, under the current legal framework, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires that all in-
termediaries, stock exchange operators, and registered investment advi-
sors implement and maintain reasonably written policies and procedures
that take into consideration the nature of their activities in order to avoid
wrongful uses of privileged information32 either by their employees or any
person associated with them.33 These policies and procedures, deemed
warranted by public interest and the protection of investors, are com-
monly referred to as a “Chinese wall” (or simply, a “wall”) and will be
reviewed later in this Article.
27. Id. at 11.
28. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 43.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 53 (statement by Laura N. Beny,
Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School).
31. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/in-
sider.htm (last visited June 17, 2014) (“Insider trading violations may also include ‘tipping’
such information, securities trading by the person ‘tipped,’ and securities trading by those
who misappropriate such information.”).
32. Stephen L. Sapp, Partner, Locke, Liddell & Sapp LLP, Presentation to the Na-
tional Society of Compliance Professionals: Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities
Laws: An Overview For a Diversified Financial Services Company Compliance Program 5
(2000), available at http://www.lockelord.com/ (indicating that the non-public information re-
fers to information not disclosed to the market in a way that is available to investors in a
general manner).
33. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (2012); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (2012).
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B. General Aspects of the Legislative Regulation of Insider Trading
in the United States
Insider trading is typically defined as the unlawful trading in securities
by persons who possess material, non-public information about a publi-
cally traded company (the issuer) or regarding the market for the com-
pany’s shares.34 The concept of insider trading developed over the years
through both administrative jurisprudence of the SEC and judicial opin-
ions, mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the legal frame-
work for most insider trading regulation is based on (i) Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act and its corresponding Rule 10b-5,35 (ii) Section 16 of the
1933 Act, (iii) Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act and its corresponding Rule
14e-3, and (iv) the legal amendments enacted in the 1980s to the Acts,
including the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”)36 and the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“IT-
SFEA”).37 Additionally, three other regulations are indirectly applicable
to insider trading: (i) the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,38 (ii) the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),39 and the (iii) Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).40
While the emblematic example of an insider is a corporate manager,
“insider trading” also encompasses the notion of insider tipping, which is
not confined strictly to individuals employed by the issuer.41 Thus, insider
trading, as understood by most authorities, is actually a quite broad term
that has the potential to catch within its purview more than just technical
insiders.42
To protect the investing public, insider trading rules establish generally
that,
[A]nyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation,
has access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone may not
34. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT &
PREVENTION § 1:1 (2013); see also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 1.1; Christopher M.
Gorman, Are Chinese Walls The Best Solutions to The Problem of Insider Trading and Con-
flicts of Interest in Brokers-Dealers?, 9 FORDHAM CORP. & FIN. L.J., 475, 476 (2004).
35. It is interesting to note that neither Section 10(b), nor Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act, actually refer to “insider trading.” See Sapp, supra note 32, at 2.
36. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264.
37. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677; see also Gorman, supra note 34, at 477.
38. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012).
39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
40. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
41. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider
.htm (last visited June 17, 2014).
42. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 1.2.
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take advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing, i.e., the investing public.43
The passage of ITSFEA amended a number of critical aspects of the in-
sider trading legal regime. In particular, the Act (i) expanded the defini-
tion of “controlling” shareholders, (ii) imposed supervisory responsibility
on managers of companies dealing with capital management, (iii) required
the creation and implementation of “reasonably written policies and pro-
cedures” to avoid insider trading, (iv) obligated companies to implement
policies and procedures to avoid insider trading by intermediaries, regis-
tered operators, and investment advisors, (v) increased penalties for viola-
tions of insider trading rules, and (vi) authorized the SEC to pay bounties
to those providing information on insider trading, under certain condi-
tions.44 Despite the important changes brought about by ITSFEA, the pri-
mary purpose of this law was not to regulate the practice of insider
trading, but rather to increase the damages and prison terms for convicted
inside traders.45 Therefore, the most applicable legislation governing in-
sider trading actually stems from the 1934 Act.
1. Basic aspects of Insider Trading Responsibility Under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act
Rule 10b-5,46 which implements Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, is the
SEC’s principal weapon against insider trading.47 Notably, neither Section
10(b), nor its corresponding Rule 10b-5, explicitly address “insider trad-
ing.” Despite the absence of this terminology, both the provision and the
rule have been applied to a special class of securities traders, i.e. insiders.
The language of Rule 10b-5 has been construed liberally by the
courts.48 Indeed, the word “purchase” (of the phrase “purchase or sale”)
has been understood to include any contract to buy, purchase, or other-
wise acquire, and “sale” has been understood to encompass any contract
43. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 43 (explaining the rule established in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)).
44. Sapp, supra note 32, at 2.
45. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, §§ 3-4, 102 Stat. 4677, 4677-80.
46. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
47. MACEY, supra note 16, at 49.
48. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 3
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to sell or otherwise dispose of a security.49 Given these broad interpreta-
tions of the statutory language, Rule 10b-5 is believed to cover essentially
any transfer of securities other than an absolute gift50 (e.g., the transfer of
securities by reason of merger is covered by the statute).
The phrase “in connection with” has similarly been construed broadly.
To violate the rule, a person need not have participated directly in the
related fraudulent or deceptive securities transactions.51 This expansive
notion of connectivity under Rule 10b-5 authorizes the SEC to regulate
the use of any manipulative or deceptive practice that the SEC finds detri-
mental to an investor’s interests.52 However, despite the rule’s reach, if a
corporation has exercised the required due diligence to ensure that its dis-
closures were accurate, full, and not misleading at the time they were
made, it might escape Rule 10b-5 liability, even if those disclosures were
later found to be misleading or inaccurate.53
According to Rule 10b-5, receipt of material gives rise to essentially
two legal options: (i) disclose and trade, or (ii) do not disclose and do not
trade. In other words, insiders or other individuals who possess more than
the same relevant investment decision-making information available to the
public must not trade in those securities unless they disclose the informa-
tion at issue. Since insiders are under no obligation to trade, the clearest
solution is to forego any such transaction. However, it is important to note
that the insider information must be material to invoke liability54 for in-
sider trading. A determination of materiality turns on whether the infor-
mation in question would be likely to cause a reasonable investor to
reevaluate the stock, given the total mix of information available to the
investor about the issuer.55
The mere possession of undisclosed material information does not it-
self trigger responsibility to abstain from trading under federal securities
laws.56 In fact, under the traditional insider trading scheme, there was not
even a duty to disclose when the person who traded on inside information
49. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 3 LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.6 (6th ed.,
2014).
50. See Rick Tulli, Insider Gifts of Securities to Charities, FROM THE SOX UP (Dec. 20,
2011), http://www.fromthesoxup.com/2011/12/insider-gifts-of-securities-to-charities/.
51. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (“We do not
believe that Congress intended that the proscriptions of the Act would not be violated unless
the makers of a misleading statement also participated in pertinent securities transactions in
connection therewith[.]”).
52. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 47; see also Erika L. Robinson et al., SEC Reaffirms
the Broad Reach of Rule 10b-5 to Private Companies, WILMERHALE (Dec. 22, 2011), http://
www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90979.
53. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 20.
54. See generally David S. Ruder & Neil S. Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125.
55. LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 5:2.
56. See Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(May 16, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/8-kinterp.htm.
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was not a fiduciary to the company.57 This situation has changed with re-
cently enacted legislation and case law.58
2. Rule 10b-5 Refers to Individual Plaintiffs Who May Sue Insider
Traders for Damages
Prosecution by the SEC is the most common method of enforcing in-
sider trading rules, although private suits by parties damaged by fraudu-
lent conduct also play a notable role.59 Professor Donald C. Langevoort
states that “private rights of action by marketplace traders [are] something
of relatively small practical importance in the world of insider trading en-
forcement.”60 Under Section 20A(b)(3) of the 1934 Act,61 there is an ex-
press right to recover against any controlling person of a tipper or trader
under the standards set forth in Section 20A(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act62:
Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale
of securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such
violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based
on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
Section 20A requires a predicate showing of a violation of some other
provision (e.g., Rule 10b-5 or 14e-3), without which a 20A case will be
dismissed.63 Section 20A(c) then imposes joint and several liability on per-
sons who violate the insider trading rules by simply communicating mate-
57. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 227 (1980)) (“In Chiarella, we accepted the two elements . . . for establishing a Rule
10b-5 violation: (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
58. See generally Case Law, Dodd Frank Update, (http://www.doddfrankupdate.com/
DFU/ArticlesDFU.aspx?taxonomy=CaseLaw1).
59. Cf. LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 9:6; see also MACEY, supra note 16, at 58.
60. LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 9:6,
61. Section 20A(b)(3) of the Exchange Act states:
No person shall be liable under this section solely by reason of employing another per-
son who is liable under this section, but the liability of a controlling person under this
section shall be subject to section 20(a) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(3) (2012).
62. Section 20A(a) of the Exchange Act provides:
Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder
by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, non-public informa-
tion shall be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who,
contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such
violation, has purchased (where such violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold
(where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
Id. § 78t-1(a).
63. LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 9:6 n.1.
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rial, nonpublic information, in addition to those to whom the
communications were directed and who then traded improperly.64
For a private claim to be actionable under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff
must establish the following requisite elements: (i) federal jurisdiction; (ii)
materiality of the misstatement or omission; (iii) reliance; (iv) damages;65
and (v) scienter.66
Jurisdictional means can almost always be easily established through
facilities of interstate communication (e.g., phone call, mail, email). Infor-
mation need only be proven as having been “transmitted” via interstate
means, not necessarily proven to be the fraudulent communication.67 As
discussed in Part I.B.1, the materiality standard questions whether a rea-
sonable person would attach importance to the information in deciding
how to invest.68 Though proof of reliance remains a required element to
establish a Rule 10b-5 claim, courts sometimes assume reliance based
upon the factual circumstances.69 To establish damages, the plaintiff must
prove that he suffered an out-of-pocket pecuniary loss.70 The ceiling for
damages is the insider trading profit, or “actual damages,” per Section
28(a) of the 1934 Act.71 Courts can measure these actual damages in a
variety of ways to achieve different outcomes.72 However, only compensa-
tory recovery is allowed in private actions, not punitive.73 Scienter is the
final required element of 10b-5 actions for private damages.74 In the 1980s,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in two separate cases that “scienter is an
element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity
of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.”75
64. Id. § 9:3; see also Exchange Act § 20A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(c).
65. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 49.
66. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 4.1.
67. See Gorman, supra note 34, at 478 (stating that “[t]he fraud is based on the failure
of the party in possession of the inside information to disclose it to the other party.”); see also
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
68. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 49.
69. See, e.g, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (“The presumption of
reliance employed in this case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation,
supports, the congressional policy embodied in the 1934 Act.”).
70. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 74.
71. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2012); see also
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, §§ 4.8.2-.3.
72. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 4.8.2.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 4.4.1 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeldler, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
75. Aaron v. SEC, 44 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193; WANG
& STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 4.4.1.
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3. Government Enforcement of Federal Rules and Laws on Frauds
Insider trading is subject to criminal enforcement by the Department
of Justice and civil enforcement by the SEC.76 “Where probability of de-
tection is low, very high penalties are necessary to deter potential law-
breakers.”77 To that end, the SEC generally seeks treble damages under
the ITSA of 1984,78 and has a wide range of enforcement measures availa-
ble to it, including equitable remedies, such as injunctions, disgorgement,
cease-and-desist orders, and trading bans against individuals.79
The vast majority of criminal insider trading cases are brought under
Section 24 of the 1933 Act and Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.80 Section 24
of the 1933 Act81 and Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act82 require that the
government demonstrate that the defendant “willfully” violated an SEC
rule or statutory provision (such as Rule 10b-5).83 Prosecutions are also
brought under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes,84 which establish
that a defendant (or a defendant’s associate) can be convicted if he or she
knowingly causes something to be delivered by mail or causes a use of the
wires,85 in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.86 Finally, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 dictates that securities and commodities fraud may be
punishable by up to 25 years in prison.87 A prima facie criminal insider
trading case is comprised of the following elements, which the government
must prove: (i) a willful and fraudulent purchase or sale of a security, (ii)
the breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence
by virtue of the sale, and (iii) possession and use of material nonpublic
information about that security at the time of the sale.88 For a criminal
conviction, prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct
was a willful violation of the law, meaning that it must be proven “that the
76. Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 29-30 (submission of James H. Clinger,
Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a
financial crimes division). See generally Criminal Insider Trading, supra note 17.
77. MACEY, supra note 16, at 6.
78. Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 7 (statement of Linda Thomsen, Dir., Div.
of Enforcement, SEC).
79. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 7.1.1.
80. Id. § 7.2.1.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2012).
82. Id. § 78ff(a).
83. Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of Ronald J. Tenpas, Assoc.
Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
84. See generally 18 U.S.C §§ 1341-51 (2012).
85. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 11.3.
86. Id. § 11.2 (citing Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989); Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997); Chisolm v. Transouth Fin.
Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 1996)).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
88. See Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 116 (prepared statement of Ronald J.
Tenpas, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
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defendant was aware, at the time of the insider trade, that he or she was
doing something in violation of the law.”89
The U.S. Congress has recommended that civil enforcers and prosecu-
tors cooperate more.90 Some academics have also argued that there should
be more of a focus on prevention and less on raising penalties.91
C. Particular Aspects of Insider Trading in Financial Services Companies
One of the most important pieces of legislation regulating financial ser-
vices firms is the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.92 This law contains
provisions that work to combat insider trading via, among other means,
the adoption of a corporate code of ethics.93 The Act also requires the
institution of “Chinese Walls.”94
The purpose of a so-called Chinese Wall is to serve as a “barrier that
prevents insider trading”95 and as a “structural technique to help reduce
analysts’ conflicts of interest.”96 Chinese Walls were initially conceived of
as voluntary policies and procedures to be established autonomously by
securities brokers, but, overtime, and based on its legal powers, the SEC
has made them mandatory.97 These tools arose for the first time as a part
of an extra-judicial compromise between SEC and Merrill Lynch in 1968.98
Chinese Wall policies and procedures are designed on a case-by-case basis,
based on the nature of the firm involved.99 In most instances, they are a
part of a company-wide written code of ethics and the contractual obliga-
tions of each firm employee.100
In addition to the safeguards that these “walls” reinforce within a firm,
such policies must also monitor operations in securities performed by an
employee outside of his firm. This goal is accomplished by requiring the
employee to obtain duplicates of trade confirmations and account state-
ments. Further, the internal review of an employee’s external operations
must be documented with an annotation stating the period of time and
frequency of the review, as well as who executed it. For all transactions,
whether through direct operations of the employee or in observation or
89. Id.
90. See Criminal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
91. See  Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at  67-68 (statement of John C. Coffee,
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School).
92. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012).
93. 17 C.F.R. 275.204A-1 (2014).
94. See Investment Advisers Act § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a.
95. Gorman, supra note 34, at 475.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 483.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 485.
100. Id. at 486.
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restricted access lists,101 the securities must be verified in a periodic report
made available for inspection by the SEC.
While Chinese Walls have been very useful in the fight against insider
trading in the United States, they have not been efficient in all circum-
stances and have been subject to criticism.102 The fact that many invest-
ment banks did not maintain or comply with their Chinese Walls was one
of the main instigators for the enactment of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.103
D. The Punitive Legal Framework Against Insider Trading
and Other Abuses
The U.S. legal system contemplates severe penalties against inside
traders to protect investors in cases of insider trading violations. Penalties
apply not only to individuals subject to fiduciary duties, but also to “tem-
porary insiders,” that is, those placed in a temporary fiduciary relationship
with a firm, and even to those who do not have any fiduciary relationship
with the firm and its shareholders, under the “misappropriation”
theory.104
Administrative, civil, and criminal penalties may be meted out for in-
sider trading violations. An example of an administrative penalty is the
prohibition of those persons from serving as corporate officers, directors,
employees, intermediaries, or investment advisors in the future.105 Civil
penalties consist of the reimbursement of all amounts unduly received
(“disgorgement”) and punitive payments (“civil penalties”) of up to three
times the profits obtained or the losses avoided through insider trading.
Furthermore, controlling shareholders found guilty are subject to these
civil penalties in personam.106 Finally, criminal penalties may be a maxi-
mum of one million dollars in the case of individuals, two and a half mil-
lion dollars when concerning corporations, and up to ten years of
imprisonment for each intentional violation of insider trading.107 Part VI
will further develop specific aspects of U.S. insider trading legislation and
case law, with the aim of presenting proposals for the reinforcement of the
Chilean insider trading legal framework.
101. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF SUMMARY REPORT ON EXAMINATIONS OF
INFORMATION BARRIERS: BROKER-DEALER PRACTICES UNDER SECTION 15(G) OF THE SE-
CURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 24 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/
informationbarriers.pdf.
102. Gorman, supra note 34, at 475.
103. Id. at 489.
104. See infra Part VII.G.
105. Sapp, supra note 32, at 16.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id.
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INSIDER TRADING IN CHILE
The Chilean securities market was created in 1893 with the establish-
ment of the Commerce Exchange Bolsa de Comercio of Santiago.108 How-
ever, it was not until the 1981 Securities Market Act (“SMA”)109 that
insider trading was first regulated.110 By comparison, insider trading regu-
lation was established in the United States by virtue of the 1934 Act, more
than fifty years prior. 111
Insider trading in Chile was originally referred to as the “use of re-
served information.”112 In fact, until 1994, former Article 13 of the
SMA113 prescribed that:
Any person that, per reason of his office or position, obtains access to the
information of a company and its businesses, that has not yet been officially
divulged to the market by the company in compliance with the present law,
and that has the ability to influence the price of the company’s securities, must
keep strict reserve about that information.
Likewise, it is forbidden for the persons mentioned in the previous paragraph
to use the reserved information to obtain for himself or others advantages
through the purchase or sale of stock.
Such persons must ensure that this does not occur through their subordinated
employees and third parties.
The persons mentioned in the first paragraph that act in violation of this pro-
vision must reimburse the company all profit that they have obtained through
the transaction in securities of the company.
All persons harmed by the violation of this Article shall have a right to re-
quest an indemnification from all of the persons indicated in the first para-
graph, except if that person had knowledge of the reserved information.114
Article 13 was largely criticized before its repeal in 1994 for multiple
reasons, including: (i) its failure to define the “use of privileged informa-
tion”—an omission that confounded the definition of “reserved informa-
tion;”115 (ii) its restrictive scope, which limited prohibited conduct to the
purchase and sale of a company’s stock using information about the com-
108. See generally JUAN RICARDO COUYOUMDJIAN & JOSEFINA TOCORNAL, HISTORIA
DE LA BOLSA DE COMERCIO DE SANTIAGO, 1893-1993 [HISTORY OF THE SANTIAGO STOCK
EXCHANGE, 1893-1993] (1993).
109. Law No. 18045, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) (original ver-
sion). All citations to Law 18045 refer to the most recent version unless otherwise specified.
110. Jose´ Miguel Reid Undurraga, Fundamentos de la Prohibicio´n del Uso de la In-
formacio´n Privilegiada en Chile: Una Visio´n Crı´tica, 31 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 439,
440 (2004); see also FRANCISCO GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, INFORMACIO´N PRIVILEGIADA EN EL
MERCADO NACIONAL 47 (2007).
111. Sapp, supra note 32, at 1.
112. Arturo Prado Puga, Acerca del Concepto de Informacio´n Privilegiada en el Mer-
cado de Valores Chileno: Su Alcance, Contenido y Lı´mites, 30 REVISTA CHILENA DE DER-
ECHO 237, 240 (2003).
113. Law No. 18045, art. 13, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
114. Id.; see also Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 240 (emphasis added).
115. Marı´a Fernanda Va´squez Palma, Revisio´n del A´mbito de Aplicacio´n Subjetivo y
Objetivo de la Nocio´n de Informacio´n Privilegiada en Chile: Un Examen de la Normativa a la
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pany that had not been “officially” revealed;116 (iii) the provision’s failure
to regulate fraudulent conduct that was directly related to the use of confi-
dential corporate information, such as “the communication or the recom-
mendation of privileged information to third parties;”117 (iv) its obligation
to disgorge profits to the company, which seemed to indicate that what
was being protected was the property right that the company had over the
information, and the failure to base the penalty in the use and misappro-
priation of information by the third party instead;118 (v) the lack of strin-
gent penalties for the harm caused to the market, generally;119 and finally,
(vi) Article 13’s absence of a definition for insider trading, on the one
hand, and its confounding of insider trading with reserved information, on
the other.120
With respect to confusion between the concept of “use of privileged
information” and that of “use of reserved information,” the Super-
intendencia de Valores y Seguros (“SVS”), Chile’s stock market and com-
pany regulator, directed, in 1987, that:
[T]he person who purchases or sells publicly traded securities using reserved
information, is in a position of privilege with respect to the rest of the market,
since that person is using information that, given its character, must be consid-
ered as privileged information. Thus, and in accordance with this interpreta-
tion, reserved information is also, with respect to the individual who uses it,
privileged information. In consequence, both terms may be applied to the
same situation.121
Furthermore, Article 10, Paragraph 3 of the SMA,122 in accordance with
Article 43 of the Stock Corporations Act (“SCA”),123 allowed directors
and administrators to determine which facts were to be considered re-
served information.  Consequently, because insider trading was tied to the
use of reserved information, and directors and administrators categorized
company information, those very directors and administrators were the
ones to decide when their own insider trading liability arose under Articles
Luz de las Tendencias Doctrinales y Jurisprudenciales, 17 REVISTA DE DERECHO UNIVER-
SIDAD CATO´LICA DEL NORTE 239, 247-48 (2010).
116. Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 240.
117. MARI´A AGNES SALAH ABUSLEME, RESPONSABILIDAD POR USO DE INFORMACIO´N
PRIVILEGIADA EN EL MARCADO DE VALORES 146 (2004).
118. Reid Undurraga, supra note 110, at 441.
119. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 146 (indicating that such penalties were in-
cluded later on, through criminal provisions).
120. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 247-48.
121. Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 241 (quoting SVS, Circular No. 2506 (July 10,
1987)) (noting that insider trading was arguably regulated, as a part of the broader concept of
reserved information).
122. Law No. 18045, art. 10, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
123. Law No. 18046, art. 43, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
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41 and 43 of the SCA,124 and in what cases they were not obliged to reveal
corporate information.125
Prior to 1994,126 the Chilean concept of insider trading was limited to
corporate information “not yet officially disclosed to the market.”127
However, Law 19,301 of 1994128 introduced new title XXI to the SMA
(“Of Privileged Information”).129 The aim of this new legislation – which
was likely based on the U.S. securities system130 – was to protect the
“equality and transparency of the Securities Market, punishing those who
manipulate[d] it or threaten[ed] its correct operation[,]”131 and to also “in-
crease competitiveness.”132 In addition, this Law introduced to Chile a
broader concept of insider trading. Law 19,389 of 1995133 and Law 19,705
of 2000134 complemented Law 19,301. These two laws dictated, among
other matters, “the persons affected by the prohibition; the presumptions
affecting those who have access to privileged information; the regulation
of securities intermediation activities; and established civil liability
provisions.”135
Finally, the last relevant legal amendment concerning insider trading in
Chile was introduced by Law 20,382 of 2009,136 regarding corporate gov-
ernance, which was passed with the general purpose of facilitating Chile’s
entry into the OECD.137 This Law introduced new areas of regulation into
Chile’s broader regulatory scheme. Examples of these regulations include
the creation of a presumption of access to information by persons who
interact with the company, restrictions on stock transactions by securities
brokers who have access to privileged information, the requirement that
certain companies set up self-regulatory mechanisms to prevent insider
124. See id. art. 41 (stating that directors are jointly liable for damages caused to the
corporation and the shareholders due to their fraudulent or negligent actions); id. art. 43
(providing that directors must protect corporate information that they receive by virtue of
their position and that has not been made public by the corporation).
125. See Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 240.
126. Id. at 242.
127. Law No. 18045, art. 13, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
128. Law No. 19301, Marzo 7, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
129. Id. tit. XXI; see also Reid Undurraga, supra note 110, at 441.
130. See Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 242 (referring to the U.S. legislature’s strong
influence on the insider trading regulatory realm and stating that the “addition through Law
19,301, of March 19, 1994, of the new Title XXI into Law 18,045 [was] clearly inspired by U.S.
legislation.”).
131. Id.
132. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 246 (referring to the purposes of Law No. 18045
of 1981).
133. Law No. 19389, Mayo 18, 1995, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
134. Law No. 19705, Diciembre 20, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
135. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 248.
136. Law No. 20382, Octubre 20, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
137. ROBERTO GUERRERO V & JOSE´ MIGUEL REID, NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
RULES IN CHILE 1 (2011), available at http://www.iflr1000.com/pdfs/Directories/24/Chile.pdf.
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trading opportunities, and the prohibition on selling securities by persons
with access to privileged information.138
In sum, the regulation of insider trading in Chile began almost a cen-
tury after the securities market was created in that country and about half
a century after the regulation of insider trading began in the United States.
Several legislative amendments since 1994 have extended the scope of in-
sider trading regulations, creating new duties and prohibitions, with the
clear goal of protecting the equality and transparency of the Chilean se-
curities market and, ultimately, the national public economic order.139
It is possible to draw commonalities between the U.S. and Chilean in-
sider trading regulatory systems: both systems were traditionally focused
on the protection of shareholders and have evolved in recent years toward
a more holistic or “institutional” perspective centered on the overall pro-
tection of securities markets. In the original model, the aim was to protect
investors as individual actors in the economy, and, to that end, the propri-
etary approach was deemed sufficient. This view was congruent with the
general focus of Chilean legislation on property rights, which relies heavily
on the individual nature of ownership rights.140 In the new model, the le-
gal protection of securities markets and the criminalization of insider trad-
ing is aimed at protecting the “correct performance of the securities
market.”141  In this latter orientation, the essential value protected is “the
‘public faith’ or ‘public confidence’ in the transparent performance of se-
curities markets, and in the equality of access to information.142
IV. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN CHILE
A. Concept of Insider Trading in Chile
In Chile, insider trading is chiefly regulated by Title XXI of the SMA.
Article 164, which governs the use of privileged information, uses three
classifications to define insider trading, namely: (i) “any information re-
garding one or more issuers, their businesses or one or more securities
issued by them, not disclosed to the market, and whose knowledge, by its
nature, has the aptitude to influence the price of the issued securities[,]”143
(ii) “the reserved information referred to in article 10 of this law[,]”144 and
138. See Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 249.
139. See Marı´a Fernanda Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN y Uso de Informacio´n
Privilegiada: Un Ana´lisis de la Correcta Delimitacio´n de las Infracciones Legales, 16 IUS ET
PRAXIS 461, 477 (2010) [hereinafter Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN].
140. Dante Figueroa & Arturo Fermandois, Comparative Constitutional Protection of
Contracts in the United States and Chile, INT’L L. RESEARCH INFORMER, Summer 2012, at 7,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112318 (“Chilean legislation
follows the traditional French civil law model regarding the protection of property rights.”).
141. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 78.
142. Id. at 78.
143. Law No. 18045, art. 164, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
144. Id. Concerning reserved information, paragraph three of article 10, id. art. 10, pro-
vides that: “three fourths of the directors in office may approve to give a reserved character
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(iii) “information concerning decisions for the purchase, sale, or rejection
of specific offers made by an institutional investor in the securities
market.”145
The essence of the concept of privileged information refers to informa-
tion “not yet known by the public,”146 whose use benefits exclusively one
specific individual and not all market participants – a so-called “asymme-
try of information.”147 The expression “any information,” used in Article
164, has been understood to refer to “any data, antecedent, fact, event,
message, symbol, circumstance, communication, intention or rumor,
whether verbal or written, that has the potential to qualify as privileged
information.”148 Importantly, it is not necessary for the information to be
in writing to qualify as “privileged.”149
1. Essential Elements in the Definition of Article 164 of the
Securities Market Law
There are three essential elements of privileged information, as de-
fined in Article 164. First, the information must be unknown to the mar-
ket,150 that is, not yet “absorbed or evaluated.”151 Second, the information
must pertain to securities issuers, their businesses, or securities issued by
them.152 And third, the information must have the ability to influence the
price of the securities.153
With respect to the first element, it is no longer required that the infor-
mation be “officially” disclosed to the public for the information to lose its
to certain facts and information regarding pending negotiations that if revealed, may
prejudice the interests of the corporation. With respect to issuers not administered by a board
or similar committee, the decision about reservation must be adopted by the unanimity of the
administrators.” In turn, paragraph two of article 10, id., directs that the respective entities
“must disclose truthfully, sufficiently and timely any fact or essential information related to
them and their businesses in the moment when the fact occurs or when it becomes known to
such entities.”
145. Id. art. 164.
146. Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 239.
147. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 242.
148. FRANCISCO PFEFFER URQUIAGA, CONCEPTO DE INFORMACIO´N PRIVILEGIADA Y
DEBERES DE CONDUCTA DE QUIENES ESTA´N EN POSESIO´N DE ELLA, A LA LUZ DE LA JURIS-
PRUDENCIA EMANADA DE LA EXCMA. CORTE SUPREMA 10 (2008), available at http://www
.pfeffer.cl/publicaciones/doc/com_revista_d_com_uch_vf_%2021_05_08.pdf.
149. Id. at 13 (“it is not necessary to comply with the requirement that the information
be in writing to configurate the generic concept of privileged information.”).
150. Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 243.
151. Id. at 244.
152. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 250-51.
153. See Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 243-46.
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“privileged” character; it suffices that the information be communicated to
outsiders by any appropriate means.154
Concerning the second element, “issuers of securities” are those who
have the ability to make public offerings of securities and are registered in
the Securities Registry maintained by the SVS.155 Article 3 of the SMA
defines securities as “any transferable instrument including stocks,
purchase and sale options, bonuses, debentures, mutual fund quotas, sav-
ing plans, effects of commerce and, in general, all credit or investment
instruments.”156 Examples of information that has the potential to influ-
ence the price of securities include internal decisions related to staff, the
distribution of dividends, the outcome of significant litigation, develop-
ments affecting the reputation of the company, labor issues, potential
mergers or acquisitions, public offerings, environmental matters,157 resig-
nation of key officers, government investigations, and information on
profit estimates.158
Importantly, not every piece of information qualifies for the purpose of
Article 164.159 The information must be both precise and concrete.160 For
example, information about general market trends and simple rumors do
not suffice, unless the latter refers to an upcoming public offering of a
given company.161 Moreover, the information must be material or essen-
tial, since information of this nature is precisely the kind whose protection
is sought by the obligations to report established in Articles 9 and 10 of
the SMA.162
Despite this explication of Article 164’s elements, several critics con-
tend that the provision’s deficient drafting does not clarify whether the
154. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 53 (stating that the judge has discretion to
determine the appropriate parameters of the case and to consider whether the information
has been revealed to the market).
155. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 253.
156. Law No. 18045, art. 3, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
157. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 263-64.
158. See Sapp, supra note 32, at 4-5.
159. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 256.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 54-55.
162. See Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 256. The author notes that article 10 of the
SMA, Law No. 18045, art. 10, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), requires
entities registered in the Securities Registry to “disclose in a true, sufficient and timely man-
ner, all essential facts or information related to themselves and their business when such facts
or information become known to them.” Further, article 9 of the SMA, id. art. 9, provides
that: “Registration in the Securities Registry requires the issuer to disclose in a true, suffi-
cient, and timely manner all essential facts or information related to itself, or to the offered
securities and the offer. Essential information is defined as the information that a reasonable
man would consider important for his investment decisions.”
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three above-mentioned elements must be present in each of the three cat-
egories of privileged information.163
2. Reserved Information
Article 10 of the SMA defines “reserved information” as “facts or
materials related to pending negotiations, that when known may harm the
interest of the company, when three fourths of the board members agree
to qualify such information as reserved.”164 As originally drafted, Article
10, Paragraph 4 established that a board resolution rendering certain facts
or materials reserved was to be communicated to the SVS on the next day
after its approval via the technological means specified by the SVS.165 Law
19,301, passed in 1994, abolished the requirement that a company
(through its board) expressly declare that given information is reserved or
otherwise protected in order for insider trading to occur.166 In sum, re-
served information is currently understood as a type of privileged informa-
tion, or information that is not widely known and whose use will benefit
only a few, rather than all market participants.
B. Persons Subject to the Prohibition on the Use
of Privileged Information
1. Persons Expressly Mentioned in Article 165 of the SMA
Article 165 of the SMA delineates which individuals are subject to Ar-
ticle 164’s prohibitions on the use of privileged information. The statutory
language reads: “Any person who, per reason of his office, position, activ-
ity or relationship with the respective issuer of securities, or with the per-
sons indicated in the next article [166], possesses privileged information
. . . .”167 “Office” refers to corporate officers of the issuers; “position”
alludes to permanent or sporadic interaction with the company (such as an
external auditor, risk rating agencies, or a consultant); “activity” refers to
the tasks performed within a corporation; and “relationship” refers to the
link between the recipients of the information with its source of the infor-
mation.168 The phrase “any person” targets individuals as well as legal
entities.169
163. See, e.g., Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 251 (criticizing the language of the
provision and arguing that it does not clearly determine whether such elements apply to all
the typologies mentioned therein. However, despite this critique, the author leans towards
the affirmative).
164. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 56.
165. Law No. 18045, art. 10, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) (original
version).
166. See id.
167. Id. art. 165.
168. Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 262-63.
169. See Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 272; see also id. at 272-73 & n.93 (citing
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 27 octubre 2005, “Hurtado Vicun˜a, Juan
& otros c. Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros,” Rol de la causa: 4930-2004 (Chile)
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2. Institutional Investors at the Securities Market
The appearance of enormous Pension Fund Administrators (“PFAs”)
during the 1980s spurred a revolution in the Chilean securities market.170
In response, the SMA incorporated a new Article 4(e) defining institu-
tional investors as banks, financial companies, insurance companies, na-
tional re-insurance entities, fund administrators authorized by law, and
other entities identified by SVS regulation which were made subject to
legal restrictions related to the use of privileged information.171 Since the
1980s, the Chilean Supreme Court has also greatly expanded the list of
individuals subject to legal restrictions concerning the use of privileged
information. For example, in 2005, the Court held that “the law does not
require a direct link between the source of information and the person
who receives it: ‘any person’ may be an active user of privileged
information.”172
3. Presumptions of Possession of Privileged Information
Article 166 of the SMA creates a presumption regarding the possession
of privileged information to which two sets of people are subject. For
those individuals covered by the first paragraph of Article 166, the pre-
sumption always applies. One the other hand, under paragraph 2, the pre-
sumption applies only if such persons had direct access to the privileged
information.
Under paragraph 1 of Article 166, certain persons are always presumed
to possess privileged information about an issuer. Among them are direc-
tors and persons with management responsibilities within the company,
controlling shareholders, and financial advisors and securities brokers.
Per paragraph 2 of Article 166, other individuals are subject to a pre-
sumption of possession of privileged information insofar as they have had
direct access to such information. This category includes external auditors,
members of the boards of risk rating agencies that rate securities of the
issuer, supervised persons within the company, consultants, public employ-
ees of institutions that enforce legal regulations against issuers of publicly
traded securities or funds, and certain family members of persons listed in
paragraph 2 of Article 166. Since “direct access” to the information is re-
(“[G]iven the breadth of the aforementioned provision, its scope of application is broad and
includes all persons that by reason of their office, position, activity, or relationship have ac-
cess to privileged information; ‘any person’ includes not only individuals but also legal enti-
ties, since the legislator did not make a distinction between them.”)).
170. See Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], The Chil-
ean Pension System 6 (OECD Ageing Working Papers, Working Paper No. AWP 5.6), availa-
ble at http://www.oecd.org/els/public-pensions/2429310.pdf.
171. Law No. 18045, art. 4(e), Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); see
also GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 57.
172. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 26 julio 2007, “Elesur S.A. c.
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros,” Rol de la causa: 3364-2006 (Chile) (on file with
author).
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quired for the presumption established in this paragraph to attach, the pre-
sumption does not absolve plaintiffs from bearing the burden of proof
against such persons.173 To be effective, the presumption ought to make a
de jure inference that the relevant persons have access to privileged (or
reserved) information. Of course, until such a legislative amendment takes
place, courts will continue to resolve this matter on a case-by-case basis.
4. Obligations and Prohibitions
In keeping with the global trend, Chile has gradually adopted a regula-
tory model that prohibits, but also seeks to prevent, insider trading behav-
ior through the creation of conflicts-of-interest restrictions.174 The new
rules impose unique obligations and prohibitions on several different clas-
ses of people.
In general, the rules require all those who have access to privileged
corporate information to observe duties of confidentiality, refraining from
disclosing such information or from deriving personal benefit from it.175
For the purpose of assessing insider trading, a transaction is deemed to
have occurred as of the date of acquisition or transfer of securities, inde-
pendent of the date when such transactions are formally registered by the
issuing entity.176
a. Securities Brokers
Securities brokers may perform operations related to securities, de-
spite their possession of privileged information pertaining to those securi-
ties, under certain conditions only. The operations must be “for others, not
related to the securities brokers,”177 “the order and the specific conditions
of the operation [must] originate from the client, without the intermedi-
ary’s advice or recommendation,”178 and “the operation [must] compl[y]
with the internal regulations, in conformity with [A]rticle 33.”179
Where securities brokers perform director or administrative duties for
an issuer of publicly traded securities,180 they must provide notice of their
relationship to the issuer to their clients, as specified by the SVS, and must
also abstain from performing any operation or transaction of shares issued
by such issuer for themselves or related third parties.181 These conditions
173. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 62.
174. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 151.
175. See Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN, supra note 139, at 471-72.
176. Law No. 18045, art. 165, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 168 (specifically stating that “directors, administrators, agents, main corpo-
rate officers or brokers participate in the administration of an issuer of publicly traded securi-
ties through their performance as directors, administrators, managers, main corporate
officers or liquidators thereof, of its parent or affiliate companies.”).
181. Id.
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do not apply to intermediaries that are subsidiaries of the issuer of shares,
provided that they exclusively share common directors and those directors
do not directly participate in their intermediation decisions.182
In contrast to the permissible, albeit limited, activities permitted bro-
kers under Article 168, Article 169 of the SMA describes a series of activi-
ties performed by securities intermediaries and institutional investors in
which irreconcilable conflicts of interest exist. These conflicts of interest
give rise to a duty of abstention concerning those activities.183 For exam-
ple, certain members of institutional investors may not legally participate
in a Pension Fund Administrator controlled by a third party.184
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 169 have introduced into Chilean law the
notion of a so-called “Chinese Wall.”185 As discussed in Part II, these
walls are recommended by U.S. legal experts as a preventative measure
for insider trading.186 The overarching objective of Article 169 “is to avoid
the transfer of information between different units of the same
institution.”187
b. External Auditors of Financial Statements Submitted by Institutional
Investors and Securities Brokers
External auditors have an obligation to review the internal mecha-
nisms that institutional investors and securities brokers establish and use
to generate financial statements in order to guarantee compliance with the
requirements of Title XXI and Article 33 of the SMA. Likewise, auditors
must analyze the systems by which such institutions record the data of
transactions performed with their own resources or those of third parties,
whether they administer or intermediate those transactions.188
c. Participants in Decisions Regarding the Acquisition of Securities Held
by Institutional Investors and Securities Brokers
In accordance with Article 171, paragraph 1 of the SMA, those individ-
uals directly involved in decision-making with respect to the acquisition of
securities held by institutions and securities brokers, or those who have
access to such information by virtue of their position, must inform their
managers of any acquisition or transfer of publicly traded securities within
24 hours of the transaction.189
182. Law No. 18045, art. 168, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) (em-
phasis added).
183. See id. art. 169.
184. Id. (providing that “directors, administrators, managers, main corporate officers,
financial advisors, money desk operators of a broker, may not participate in the administra-
tion of a Pension Fund Administrator controlled by third parties authorized by law.”).
185. See supra Part II.C.
186. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 169.
187. Id. at 169.
188. See Law No. 18045, art. 170, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
189. See id. art. 171 (excluding long term deposits from these transactions).
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d. The Company
Finally, per Article 171, paragraph 2, the company is responsible for
informing the SVS, within the time period and in the manner prescribed,
of any transactions whose amount reaches 500 Unidades de Fomento190
and are performed by any of the aforementioned persons.191
5. Survival of Obligations
Article 167 of the SMA prescribes that the obligations and prohibitions
described in the prior section remain in force indefinitely, regardless of
whether the persons with access to the privileged information gained ac-
cess directly from the issuer or institutional investor, or from persons who
are presumed to have possession of such information, have ceased to be in
the relevant relationship or position.192 The SMA does not establish a
temporary framework for the enforcement of this ultra vires obligation.
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR VIOLATIONS OF INSIDER
TRADING REGULATION
A. General Provisions
1. General Responsibility for the Violation of the SMA
The violation of Article 169 of the SMA, concerning insider trading
obligations and prohibitions,193 may be subject to administrative, civil and
criminal penalties.194
a. Joint and Several Liability
Per Article 55, Paragraphs 3 and 4, of the SMA, joint and several liabil-
ity attaches in two distinct circumstances. First, directors, managers, and
auditors of issuers of publicly-traded securities may be held jointly and
severally liable for damages caused by the violation of either Chilean in-
sider trading laws and regulations or the bylaws governing the internal
operations of the organization. In the second instance, when two or more
bidders in a public offer violate Title XXV of the SMA (provisions known
as “OPAS,” governing the public offering of shares), securities issuers are,
too, held jointly and severally liable for damage caused.
b. Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Penalties
Paragraph 1 of Article 55 of the SMA establishes a violator’s obliga-
tion to pay damages, in addition to any administrative and criminal penal-
ties rendered.195 Adding further punishment, Paragraph 2 of the same
190. Chilean monetary unit.
191. Id.
192. Id. art. 167.
193. See supra Part IV.B.4.
194. See Law No. 18045, art. 172, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
195. Id. art. 55.
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provision prescribes that same obligation on the violator’s administrators
or legal representatives, except when they are able to demonstrate their
lack of participation or their opposition to the action or circumstance con-
stituting the violation.196
2. Specific Liability for Violation of Title XXI of the SMA for the Use
of Privileged Information
Article 172 of the SMA states the right of “any person harmed by ac-
tivities constituting a violation of provisions”197 related to privileged infor-
mation – as discussed in Title XXI of the SMA198 – to sue for damages
against the violators.
a. Statute of Limitations for an Action for Insider Trading
Paragraph 2 of Article 172 establishes a four-year statute of limitations
from the date upon which the privileged information “was disclosed to the
market and to the investing public” for bringing an insider trading suit.199
b. Disgorgement of the Benefits Obtained When There Are
No Other Injured Parties
If there are no other injured parties by virtue of transactions per-
formed in violation of Title XXI, then all profits or pecuniary benefits
stemming from those transactions must be disgorged to the National Trea-
sury, per Article 172, paragraph 3.200 The amount to be disgorged is deter-
mined by the SVS, without prejudice to other penalties that might also be
imposed.201
B. Administrative Responsibility
Administrative repercussions stemming from the use of privileged in-
formation are principally imposed through resolutions of the SVS.202
However, the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (Super-
intendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, “SBIF”) also plays an
important enforcement role, since all banks must be legally organized as
stock corporations in Chile.203
Article 58 of the SMA directs that the SVS shall impose the pertinent
administrative penalties for violations of its provisions. As discussed
above, Article 172 similarly prescribes that when an improper transaction
196. See id.
197. Id. art. 172.
198. Id. tit. XXI.
199. Id. art. 172.
200. See Law No. 18045, art. 172, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
201. Reid Undurraga, supra note 110, at 442.
202. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 186.
203. Decree with Force of Law No. 3, art. 27, Noviembre 26, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Chile).
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has occurred, but no one has been injured by it, profits or pecuniary bene-
fits must be disgorged. In conformity with Article 4(q) of Decree Law
3,538,204 the SVS is empowered to determine the amount of such penal-
ties.205 In doing so, the agency considers “the average market price of the
public offering during the previous 60 days[,]” converting such amounts to
their equivalent in Unidades de Fomento.206
Concurrently with SVS enforcement, the SBIF regulates the activities
of bank directors with respect to insider trading. SBIF’s Updated Compi-
lation of Norms (the Recopilacio´n Actualizada de Normas, or “RAN”) de-
votes a special section to this precise topic, Chapter 18-11.207 The chapter
states that, in accordance with Articles 171 and 69 of the SMA, banks must
comply with information requests from the SVS and, in doing so, deliver
certain kinds of information.208 Violation of Chapter 18-11 is punished ac-
cording to Article 19 of the General Banking Law (Ley General de
Bancos).209
There is a general consensus among experts that banks in Chile do
comply with the standards of corporate governance established by law and
the SBIF,210 within which the prohibition on use of privileged information
(or insider trading) is included. Indeed, many banks publish their manuals
for the prevention of use of privileged information on their websites,211
speaking to their confidence in their adherence with the applicable rules
and regulations.
204. Decree Law No. 3538, art. 4(q), Diciembre 23, 1980, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile).
205. Reid Undurraga, supra note 110, at 442.
206. Decree Law No. 3538, art. 4(q), Diciembre 23, 1980, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile).
207. SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS E INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS, RECOPILACIO´N
ACTUALIZADA DE NORMAS DE LA SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCOS E INSTITUCIONES
FINANCIERAS DE CHILE [Updated Compilation of Norms of Chile’s Superintendence of Banks
and Financial Institutions] ch. 18-11 (2011), available at http://www.sbif.cl/sbifweb3/internet/
archivos/norma_98_1.pdf.
208. Id.
209. Decree with Force of Law No. 3, art. 27, Noviembre 26, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Chile) (establishing fines for actions or omissions incurred by institutions subject to
the enforcement powers of the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions).
210. See Expertos: Bancos Cumplen Esta´ndar De Gobierno Corporativo [Experts:
Banks Comply with Corporate Governance Standards], LA TERCERA (May 25, 2013), http://
www.latercera.com/iphone/noticia/negocios/2013/05/655-525045-9-expertos-bancos-cumplen-
estandar-de-gobierno-corporativo.shtml.
211. See, e.g., BANCO DE CHILE, MANUAL DE MANEJO DE INFORMACIO´N DE INTERE´S
PARA EL MERCADO [MANUAL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION OF INTEREST FOR
THE MARKET] (2008), available at http://www.bancoedwards.cl/wps/wcm/connect/326414804b
4b545c93a9f7bad1441276/manual.pdf?MOD=AJPERES; CORPBANCA, POLI´TICAS PARA
EVITAR QUE INFORMACIO´N PRIVILEGIADA O RESERVADA SEA DIVULGADA A PERSONAS
DISTINTAS A LAS QUE DEBAN CONOCERLA [POLICIES TO AVOID THAT PRIVILEGED OR RE-
SERVED INFORMATION BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS OTHER THAN THOSE WHO MUST KNOW
IT], available at http://www.corpbanca.cl/storage/Politicas_reserva.pdf (last visited June 12,
2014).
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C. Civil Liability
A systematic survey of the civil liability rules affecting individuals in
violation of Chilean corporate governance standards shows that the “regu-
lation of civil liability [that affects those individuals] is much more rigor-
ous [on paper] than [under] the common law.”212 One example is the
sanction of nullity, as applied to “directors’ exoneration or limitation of
liability clauses.”213 Except in cases where directors expressly “cause their
opposition to the respective resolution to be recorded in the board min-
utes, thus ‘saving’ them from liability,”214 directors who abstain from vot-
ing or simply do not voice their opposition to the respective board
resolution in the aforementioned manner are thereafter equally jointly
and severally liable for the damages caused by the resolution
undertaken.215
1. General Requirements
To establish the civil liability of those who violate insider trading-re-
lated provisions or use privileged information, it is necessary both to assess
compliance with the specific requirements of insider trading regulation de-
lineated by the SMA, the SCA, and their implementing regulations, and to
analyze “the existence of an action or omission, negligence, the existence
of a harm, and causation between the action or omission and the dam-
age,”216 that is, to determine whether the civil liability requirements under
Chilean law are met.217
2. Requirements Concerning Directors of Stock Corporations
a. The Duty of Loyalty, Diligence, and Confidentiality Binding Directors
of Stock Corporations
In general, directors in Chile are bound by three duties: (i) the duty of
care, according to which “directors must use in the performance of their
duties the care and diligence that men ordinarily use in their own busi-
nesses, and the directors are jointly and severally liable for the damages
caused to the company and to shareholders by their intentional or negli-
gent actions;”218 (ii) the duty of loyalty, regulated in Articles 39, 40 and 44
of the SCA,219 which provides that directors must prioritize the interests
212. Osvaldo Lagos Villareal, La Responsabilidad Civil de los Directores de Sociedades
Ano´nimas, FORO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL, Apr.-June 2005, at 119, 124.
213. Id. at 126.
214. Id. at 136.
215. Id.
216. ILLANES RI´OS, supra note 4, at 3.
217. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 185.
218. Law No. 18046, art. 41, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
219. Id. arts. 39-40, 44; see also LAGOS VILLAREAL, supra note 212, at 146.
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of the company and the shareholders over their own interests;220 and (iii)
the duty of confidentiality of corporate information. The latter two duties
are particularly important with respect to the topic of use of privileged
information, or insider trading. In fact, while the duty of care is an obliga-
tion and expectation germane to all those engaged in legal transactions,
the duty of loyalty and confidentiality directly applies to those who man-
age businesses on behalf of another, such as directors and other corporate
managers.
With regard to the duty of loyalty, Article 42(6) and (7) of the SCA
provide specifically that directors may not “use for their own benefit or for
the benefit of related third parties, to the harm of the company, commer-
cial opportunities of which they gained knowledge through their posi-
tion,”221 or “perform illegal acts or acts contrary to the bylaws or to
corporate interests or otherwise use their position to obtain undue advan-
tages for themselves or related third parties in prejudice of corporate
interests.”222
Article 43 of the SCA establishes the so-called “duty of confidential-
ity” of directors of stock corporations.223 This provision sets forth the obli-
gation of directors to “reserve  . . . corporate businesses and corporate
information to which they gain access by reason of their position, and that
has not been officially disclosed by the company.”224 Article 165 of the
SMA clarifies this confidentiality duty, elaborating that the prohibition is
applicable while the information is non-public.225
Furthermore, while not explicitly included in the language of Chilean
securities legislation, there is also an understood duty of diligence requir-
ing directors to “[become] informed, investigate, and monitor.”226 The ex-
istence of this obligation of diligence is apparent from the multiple
220. Id. at 144 (stating that the duty of loyalty is violated in the following situations,
among others: “(i) execution of contracts with the corporation in conditions artificially
favorable to the administrator; (ii) determination of an exaggerated compensation, taking
advantage of the corporate office, or of the assets or information of the company; and (iii)
taking advantage of business opportunities about which information is [obtained] while serv-
ing in a corporate office and that should benefit the company, or by competing with the
company.”).
221. Law No. 18046, art. 42(6), Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile); see
also id. art. 148.
222. Id. art. 42(7).
223. Joaquı´n Miguel Rodrı´guez Diez, Directors and Officers Insurance: Can Chilean
Corporate Directors Protect Themselves from Possible Liability Through Insurances?, 19
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 40, 43-44 (2010).
224. Law No. 18046, art. 43, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) (“In the
case of publicly-traded stock corporations, such disclosure is presumed when the information
has been disclosed through disclosure systems to the market established by the Superinten-
dence, in accordance with [A]rticle 10 of [the SMA], or under another modality compatible
with [A]rticle 46.”).
225. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 157.
226. LAGOS VILLAREAL, supra note 212, at 145.
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presumptions of culpability for individuals who are negligent in the per-
formance of their corporate duties. .227
Therefore, the most relevant obligations of stock corporations’ direc-
tors under the duties of loyalty and confidentiality, as pertain to the matter
of insider trading, are to: (i) “[k]eep strict confidentiality of [corporate]
information;” (ii) abstain from using corporate information, either “di-
rectly or indirectly, for [their] own benefit or that of a third-party;” (iii)
“[r]efrain from recommending the purchase or sale of the securities con-
cerned;” and (iv) to “[e]nsure that their subordinates and trusted third
parties do not perform such operations.”228
3. Type of Responsibility of Directors of Stock Corporations:
Contractual or Tort
There is a long-standing debate among Chilean academics concerning
the type of liability to be bestowed upon directors for the violation of in-
sider trading-related provisions – whether contractual or tort.229 Whether
liability sounds in contract or tort is relevant because of the differences in
“their constitutive requirements, the burden of proof, the graduation of
negligence, the scope of the remedy, joint or several liability, statutes of
limitation, etc.”230 Many Chilean authors hold that no contractual rela-
tionship exists between directors and shareholders and, as such, sharehold-
ers must sue pursuant to tort liability rules.231 Notwithstanding this theory,
debate still persists about whether there is a contractual or other legal
relationship between directors and stock corporations.232
To resolve this dilemma, Chilean authors have historically made use of
two theories to explain the type of relationship existing between directors
and stock corporations. The first is the  “Theory of Representation” (or
“Agency Theory”233), under which there does exist a contractual relation-
ship and directors are, therefore, the representatives (agents) of the corpo-
ration.234 Under this theory, directors’ liability is naturally governed by
contractual liability rules.235 The alternative theory, the “Theory of the
227. See, e.g., Law No. 18045, art. 62, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)
(presuming fraud in certain cases of bankruptcy of stock brokers); id. art. 110(d) (presuming
a “relationship” between certain persons and a company based on family or business
grounds); id. art. 166 (presuming access to privileged information).
228. Rodrı´guez Diez, supra note 223, at 43-44.
229. PRIETO, ANI´BAL, BUSINESS LAWS OF CHILE, STOCK CORPORATIONS—LIABILITY OF
DIRECTORS IN A CORPORATION UNDER CHILEAN LAW § 1:34 (2013).
230. Id.
231. See ILLANES RI´OS, supra note 4, at 7.
232. LAGOS VILLAREAL, supra note 212, at 129; see also SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note
117, at 186.
233. HUGO LAVADOS MONTES, EL PROYECTO DE REFORMA AL MERCADO DE
CAPITALES Y LOS DIRECTORES DE SOCIEDADES ANO´NIMAS ABIERTAS 2 (1993).
234. Id.
235. RAU´L VARELA MORGAN, RESPONSABILIDAD GENERAL DE LOS DIRECTORES Y
GERENTES DE SOCIEDADES ANO´NIMAS 6-7 (1993).
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Organ,”236 holds that stock corporations –as fictitious entities – may not
act in real life without an administrative organ, that is, a board of direc-
tors. In this circumstance, the directors’ civil liability is imposed as a mat-
ter of law from the moment that the individuals accept their appointment
as directors.237
The traditional majoritarian position promoted the Theory of Repre-
sentation, whereby an undue use of privileged information required a pre-
vious fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the corporation.
Over time, Chilean legal doctrine has evolved, such that most authors cur-
rently accept the Theory of the Organ, requiring no previous fiduciary re-
lationship for insider trading to exist.238 Indeed, the majority of Chilean
experts on the matter, including the SVS, agree that the relationship be-
tween the directors of a corporation and the stock corporation itself is
organic and legal in nature.239 Because no agency agreement exists, the
directors may be held liable under tort liability.
D. Criminal Responsibility
Traditionally in Chile, under the societas delinquere non potest240 prin-
ciple, individuals alone may be subject to criminal liability.241 Because of
this peculiarity of Chilean law, criminal responsibility for insider trading in
Chile falls exclusively to “the administrators”242 of an entity.
The SMA and the Decree Law 3,500 of 1980 on the Pension Funds
System243 regulate criminal responsibility for the use of privileged infor-
mation. Article 60(d), (e), (g), and (h) of the SMA spell out who “shall be
subject to the penalty of imprisonment in any degree.”244 This list includes
partners, administrators and, in general any person that by reason of his or
her office or position at risk rating agencies, has access to reserved infor-
mation of classified issuers and reveals the content of that information to
third parties.245 Also included are the persons referred to in article 166
236. Id. at 7.
237. LAGOS VILLAREAL, supra note 212, at 130.
238. PFEFFER URQUIAGA, supra note 148, at 21.
239. LAGOS VILLAREAL, supra note 212, at 130.
240. Meaning a company many not commit a crime.
241. LUIS ORTI´Z QUIROGA, RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL DE LOS DIRECTORES Y GER-
ENTES DE BANCOS Y SOCIEDADES ANO´NIMAS 3 (1993).
242. Id. at 4 (mentioning Article 39 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Law No. 1853, art.
39, Febrero 13, 1906, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), according to which “criminal liability
may only be imposed on individuals.”).
243. See Decree Law No. 3500, art. 159, Noviembre 13, 1980, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile); see also Gonzalo Garcı´a Palominos, Modelo de Proteccio´n en Normas Administra-
tivas y Penales que Regulan el Abuso de Informacio´n Privilegiada en la Legislacio´n Chilena, 8
POLI´TICA CRIMINAL 23, 24 (2013), available at http://www.politicacriminal.cl/Vol_08/n_15/
Vol8N15A2.pdf.
244. Law No. 18045, art. 60, Octubre 21, 1981, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
245. Id. art. 60(d).
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who, when performing transactions or operations on publicly traded secur-
ities in the securities market or in private negotiations, intentionally use
privileged information.246 Those who, taking advantage of privileged in-
formation, actively perform an act with the aim of obtaining a monetary
benefit or avoiding a loss through any transaction with publicly traded se-
curities are likewise subject to criminal penalties.247 And, finally, the law
proscribes the conduct of those who merely reveal privileged information
with the purpose of obtaining a monetary benefit or avoiding a loss in
operations or transactions with publicly traded securities.248
Decree Law 3,500 of 1980, by contrast, expressly establishes more se-
vere imprisonment penalties for directors, managers, agents, liquidators,
money desk operators, and employees of Pension Fund Administrators249
that use privileged information and take advantage of their office or posi-
tion to perform an act for the “purpose of obtaining a monetary benefit
for himself or another, through any operation or transaction of publicly
traded securities,”250 or to divulge “privileged information related to in-
vestment decisions of any Pension Fund Administrators to persons other
than those whose duty is to perform . . . operations of publicly traded
securities on behalf . . . of such Funds.”251
VI. MOST RELEVANT CHILEAN CASES RELATED TO THE USE OF
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
A. Chispas Case
The Chispas case252 is perhaps the most famous Chilean case concern-
ing director liability for the violation of Chilean corporate governance and
insider trading rules. This case arose from Chispas’ sale of Enersis, Chile’s
largest operating company in the electric utilities sector at that time,253 to
Endesa Espan˜a,254 a Spanish electric company. The sale was executed in
1997, pursuant to a Strategic Alliance Agreement that included several
contracts between the same parties.
Enersis was managed by six “key managers,” who exercised control
through their majority ownership of “Chispas” shareholding. Chispas had
246. Id. art. 60(e).
247. Id. art. 60(g).
248. Id. art. 60(h).
249. SALAH ABUSLEME, supra note 117, at 220.
250. Decree Law No. 3500, art. 159(a), Noviembre 13, 1980, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile).
251. Id. art. 159(b).
252. Juzgado Civil de Santiago (J. Civ.) [Civil Court], 16 julio 2002, “Mackenna, Luis c.
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros,” Rol de la causa: C-4641-1997, PODER JUDICIAL No.
600 p.1137, 1310 (Chile), available at http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/senten_5_juz_
chispas_130904.pdf.
253. AGOSIN & PASTE´N, supra note 1, at 12.
254. Id.
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two classes of shares –“A” and “B.” Each key manager owned 20 percent
of the “A” shares, allowing them collectively to appoint one of a total of
nine directors of each of the Chispas companies. The key managers owned
all of the “B” shares, which allowed them to appoint another four of the
nine directors of each of the Chispas companies.255 The Chispas compa-
nies, which the key Enersis managers effectively controlled, then held
29.04 percent of Enersis shares,256 permitting the managers to appoint two
of the seven members of the board of directors of Enersis and to partici-
pate in the appointment of the directors of Enersis subsidiaries (also very
important companies in the electrical services sector).257 As a result of
their stock ownership, and because the key managers gained the confi-
dence of the other members of the Enersis board, the key managers ap-
pointed themselves as directors and main corporate officers of Enersis and
its subsidiaries. This scheme, in practice, gave the key managers effective
and total control of the Chilean electric market.258
Through the Strategic Alliance Agreement, Endesa Espan˜a sought to
gain control of Enersis and its subsidiaries. In order to achieve this result,
the parties signed several agreements through which Endesa Espan˜a
would acquire the totality of the key managers’ “A” and “B” shares in the
Chispas companies.259 The agreements governing the price and other es-
sential terms of the dealings appointed the key managers as directors of
the same companies for a five-year term and awarded a price for “B”
shares (which were owned exclusively by the key managers) that was 840
times higher than that of the “A” shares. The key managers also received
an option to acquire five percent of Endesa Espan˜a’s shares at a preferen-
tial price.260 Moreover, under the Management Agreement, the key man-
agers retained the power to administer the holding in a manner that would
secure Endesa Espan˜a’s control over Enersis and its subsidiaries.261
At the end of 1997, the SVS imposed multi-million peso fines on each
of the key managers for their violation of their duties as directors under
the then-governing corporate governance and insider trading rules.262 The
255. See Francisco Pfeffer Urquiaga, El Concepto de Control Societario, La Administra-
cio´n de la Sociedad Ano´nima, Los Conflictos de Intere´s y La Potestad Punitiva de La Super-
intendencia de Valores y Seguros en el Contexto del “Caso Chispas”, 32 REVISTA CHILENA DE
DERECHO 501, 503 (2005) [hereinafter Pfeffer Urquiaga, Control Societario] (stating that in
one of the companies—Compan˜ı´a de Inversiones Luz S.A—key managers had the power to
appoint four of the nine directors of the company).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 504.
258. See id.
259. AGOSIN & PASTE´N, supra note 1, at 12.
260. Id.
261. See Pfeffer Urquiaga, Control Societario, supra note 255, at 505.
262. Corte Suprema Confirma Millonaria Multa Contra Ex Ejecutivos de Enersis [Su-
preme Court Confirms Multimillion Fine Against Former Executives of Enersis], ENERNEWS
(July 8, 2005), http://www.enernews.com/nota/181957/corte-suprema-confirma-millonaria-
multa-contra-ex-ejecutivos-de-enersis.
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SVS found that: (i) there was a conflict of interest involved in the negotia-
tions between the key managers and Endesa, such that these managers
prioritized their personal interests over the interests of the company,263
and (ii) the key managers did not provide notice of their negotiations with
Endesa Espan˜a to the rest of shareholders, thus violating their duty of
loyalty.264 However, it is imperative to mention that the SVS, in so find-
ing, did not formulate charges for the use of privileged information against
the defendants.265
With respect to the use of privileged information, the SVS, through
Resolution 337 of October 31, 1997, instead imposed a penalty on Elesur
S.A. (a subsidiary of Endesa Espan˜a that acquired 29 percent of Enersis
shares) for having illicitly used privileged information.266 The court opined
that Elesur S.A. had violated insider trading law the moment that it ac-
quired the Enersis shares (through a public offering held on September 5,
1997), since Elesur S.A. knew that the Strategic Alliance Agreement
signed between Enersis and Endesa Espan˜a created an obligation on the
part of Endesa Espan˜a to acquire the shares that other Chispas affiliates
had in Enersis. The market did not receive this important piece of infor-
mation until October 17, 1997, implying that during “the whole period of
the public offering the market did not learn about the public offering.”267
This situation caused an “asymmetry in the knowledge of material infor-
mation [on which] to trade such securities, probably having the [ability] to
influence the price of the securities of the Chispas companies.”268
The trial court rejected the penalties on the grounds that “there had
not been access to the information, but that the information had been cre-
ated; therefore, there was no violation of Article 165 of the SMA.”269
263. See Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, Resolucio´n No. 351 (1997), available at
http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/res_351_1997.pdf;  Superintendencia de Valores y
Seguros, Resolucio´n No. 352 (1997), available at http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/
res_352_1997.pdf; Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, Resolucio´n No. 353 (1997), availa-
ble at http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/res_353_1997.pdf; Superintendencia de
Valores y Seguros, Resolucio´n No. 371 (1997), available at http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mer
cados/doc/res_371_1997.pdf; Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, Resolucio´n No. 372
(1997), available at http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/res_372_1997.pdf; Super-
intendencia de Valores y Seguros, Resolucio´n No. 373 (1997), available at http://www.svs.gob
.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/res_373_1997.pdf.
264. See supra note 263.
265. Juzgado Civil de Santiago (J. Civ.) [Civil Court], 16 julio 2002, “Mackenna, Luis c.
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros,” Rol de la causa: C-4641-1997, PODER JUDICIAL No.
600 p. 1137, 1310 (Chile), available at http://www.svs.gob.cl/sitio/mercados/doc/senten_5_juz_
chispas_130904.pdf (the Court held that the provisions of the SMA and the amendments
introduced by Law 19,075—specifically, Articles 164 and 165 regulating the use of privileged
information—were not invoked by the SVS as legal foundation of the penalties applied and,
for that reason, such provisions may not be considered as violated).
266. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 75.
267. PFEFFER URQUIAGA, supra note 148, at 2.
268. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 75-76.
269. Id. at 76.
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However, on June 6, 2006, the Appellate Court of Santiago confirmed the
fines imposed by the SVS on the Enersis managers, and this holding was
later upheld by the Supreme Court.270
The Supreme Court’s holding in the Chispas case established crucial
points for the doctrine of use of privileged information, or insider trading,
in Chile. First, it established that both legal entities, as well as individuals,
are subject to “the duties of conduct required [of] those who know privi-
leged information.”271 Second, the court explained that privileged infor-
mation includes information that “ha[s] the potential or [ability] to
produce effects on the prices of the securities in the market.”272 The court
also held that a change in market prices is not a condition sine qua non to
punish insider trading violations.273 Finally, the court held that  “the gen-
erator or owner of the information is equally obligated by the duties of
conduct required by the law [as] those who know privileged informa-
tion.”274 The rationale for this finding was that the “protected legal inter-
est of the owner of information is subordinated to the public interest[,] in
[keeping] with a well-established, orderly, transparent, and competitive
market.”275
Several authors have criticized the case’s holding that those who gener-
ate inside information are also bound by the prohibitions applicable to
insider trading. As one author states, “if the intention is to [impose] the
ban [on trading] [on] those who have intervened in the transaction or ju-
ridical act generating the information, this situation would lead to the ab-
surdity that such individual could not participate even in that act (since he
would be obliged to refrain from acquiring the shares), and in this situa-
tion, the privileged information would not even be born.”276
B. LAN (National Airlines) Case
The LAN case277 concerns Mr. Sebastia´n Pin˜era, the then-President of
Chile, who at the time of the case was a presidential candidate. Under-
standably, the case had not only legal, but also political repercussions.278
Mr. Pin˜era and Mr. Juan Cueto, both LAN directors, purchased LAN
shares through companies that they controlled, Sociedad Santa Cecilia and
270. Press Release, Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, Sentencia en Causa Elesur
Con SVS [Decision in Case Elesur v. SVS] (July 27, 2007), No. 3, available at http://www.svs
.cl/sitio/admin/Archivos/com_20070727-01.PDF.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 78; see also Va´squez Palma, supra note 115,
at 273.
277. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 8 Marzo 2010, “Super-
intendencia de Valores y Seguros v. Cueto Plaza, Juan,” Rol de la causa: 1044-2009 (Chile),
278. See generally Amar, supra note 15.
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Sociedad Canta´brico, respectively.279 The director-authorized share
purchases were finalized a mere twenty-nine minutes after the LAN board
of directors meeting concluded on July 24, 2006, during which the financial
statements of the company were approved.280 Yet, LAN’s financial state-
ments were not made public until after the market had closed on the fol-
lowing day. In other words, LAN’s financial information did not become
public until July 26, 2006, when notice of the purchase of shares was com-
municated to the SVS.281
On July 6, 2007, the SVS fined Mr. Pin˜era and Mr. Cueto for violating
their duty of abstention owed under Article 165, Paragraph 1, of the
SMA.282 Mr. Pin˜era paid the fine imposed by the SVS; Mr. Cueto ap-
pealed the SVS decision to the courts.283 In defense of the share acquisi-
tion, Mr. Cueto asserted that the information contained in the financial
statements did not have the ability to influence the price of LAN securi-
ties, and that the financial statements by themselves—without that ability
to affect price—did not constitute privileged information. He further con-
tended that the obligation not to purchase securities, derived from Article
165, may not be interpreted independently of whether the purchase deci-
sion is motivated by the use of privileged information.284  Finally, Mr.
Cueto insisted that the SVS had already declared that there was no use of
privileged information in the case.285
Both claimants insisted that their knowledge of the company’s finan-
cial information was not what led them to acquire the shares; instead, they
argued that they had purchased the shares under “a purchase model con-
sistent with the historical policy for the purchase of shares in that com-
pany.”286 Notably, in a press release dated July 6, 2007, the SVS did
indeed recognize that the claimants had demonstrated that their purchases
were not motivated by the knowledge of the financial statements.  Yet,
despite this acknowledgment, the SVS concluded that “one of the obliga-
tions established in Article 165 of the SMA, paragraph one, [was] [the]
legal prohibition [of] acquir[ing] securities [for] which privileged informa-
tion exist[ed].”287
The trial and the appellate courts confirmed the fines imposed by the
SVS,288 and their decisions provided responses to issues raised by Mr.
Cueto’s defense theories: (i) whether the financial statements by them-
279. Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN, supra note 139, at 462.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 462-63.
283. Id. at 463.
284. Id. at 463-64.
285. Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN, supra note 139, at 464.
286. GUZMA´N ANRIQUE, supra note 110, at 72-73.
287. Id. at 72.
288. Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN, supra note 139, at 466-67.
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selves – absent a consideration of their content – can influence the price of
a company’s securities, and (ii) if directors are under an absolute duty to
abstain from purchasing and selling shares based on information obtained
during a board meeting and unknown the market, even when such transac-
tions were not motivated by that information. With respect to the first
question, the trial court held that the financial statements of LAN, as well
as “those of any other company regulated under the SMA, contain and
represent privileged information, as long as they are not disclosed to the
market and [in this case] had sufficient force to influence the price of the
securities issued independently of whether this result is obtained or
not.”289 Concerning the second question, while confirming the fines im-
posed by the SVS, the trial court also confirmed the existence of a duty of
absolute abstention from trading in shares for which privileged informa-
tion exists, while such information is non-public.290
The appellate court’s dissenting opinion questioned the notion of an
absolute prohibition on trading company shares while possessing non-pub-
lic information. To bolster its proposition, the dissent raised, as an exam-
ple, a director’s right to obtain information on the state of the
corporation’s business, per Article 39 of the SCA. An individual possess-
ing this right, but also subject to a prohibition on trading on inside infor-
mation, would never be able to trade shares of the company for which he
or she is a director. Such a result would impinge the constitutional rights of
the claimants, such as the right to economic freedom and the director’s
right of property over his shares.291 This position was challenged with the
counter-argument that, once the information is no longer privileged, the
director may freely dispose of his shares, and that “the limitation imposed
in the [SMA] to contractual freedom, in particular, and to free will, in
general, operate[s] [on] the basis of a higher good, which is the protection
of the public economic order.”292
VII. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE CHANGES REGARDING INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION IN CHILE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Based on the previous discussion of the current insider trading regime,
the Chilean securities market could benefit from several legal amend-
ments to its regulatory system for insider trading.
289. Id. at 466.
290. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 8 Marzo 2010, “Super-
intendencia de Valores y Seguros v. Cueto Plaza, Juan,” Rol de la causa: 1044-2009 (Chile);
Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN, supra note 139, at 481.
291. Id. at 468.
292. Id. at 477.
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A. A More Precise Determination of Covered Subjects
SVS rule NCG No. 270 of 2009,293 which contains the “Manual for the
Management of Information of Interest for the Market”294 (the “Man-
ual”), designates those who “may acquire or sell company securities or
securities whose price . . . is conditioned, in whole or significant part, [on]
the variation of the price of such securities.”295 This mandatory norm gives
regulated entities broad latitude to determine the precise individuals sub-
ject to the insider trading restrictions mentioned in NCG No. 270.296 This
norm may be contrasted with Section 20A(a) of Exchange Act, which re-
fers to “any person that violates any provision of this title or the rules or
regulations enacted under it through the purchase or sale of a security
while in possession of material non public information.”297 Similarly, Rule
10b-5 refers to “any person . . . .”298
Similarly, NCG No. 270 also indicates that the board of directors is
obligated to ensure that information pertaining to the legal, economic, and
financial situation of the company not be disclosed to individuals beyond
those whose position or relationship to the company necessitates such dis-
closure, before the information is made public.299 This “big brother” re-
quirement borne on the board of directors seems to dilute the duty not to
engage in insider trading that is, or ought to be, applicable to any person
associated with the company, in any capacity.
To this end, greater precision should be added to the pertinent Chilean
regulations, in similar fashion to the precision exhibited by Section 20A(c)
of ITSFEA, which imposes on “any person that violates insider trading
rules through the communication of material non-public information, joint
and several liability with the person to whom the communication was di-
rected.”300 A measure like this would clarify and extend the universal duty
of abstention currently applicable only to directors of stock corporations
in Chile.
The recent U.S. legislative and jurisprudential evolution has also
greatly expanded the categorization of persons that may be considered in-
siders for all legal purposes. Thus, for example, accountants, consultants,
293. Superintendencia Valores y Seguros, Normal de Cara´cter General No. 270, Est-
ablece Normas para la Publicidad de Polı´ticas y Procedimientos Relativos a la Adquisicio´n o
Enajenacio´n de Valores de la Entidad y al Manejo y Divulgacio´n de Informacio´n para el
Mercado [Establishes Provisions for the Publicity of Policies and Procedures Related to the
Adquisition and Transference of Securities of the Entity and the Management of Information
for the Market] (Diciembre 31, 2009) [hereinafter NGC No. 270], available at http://www.svs
.gob.cl/normativa/ncg_270_2009.pdf.
294. Id. at 2.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 3.
297. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
298. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014) (emphasis added).
299. See NGC No. 270, supra note 293, at ¶ 7 para. 2.
300. LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 9:3.
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market advisors, lawyers, brokers, and lenders are deemed insiders.301 The
origin of this expansion in the categories of traditional insiders302 is found
within the Supreme Court decision of United States v. O’Hagan,303 in
which the Court expanded liability to those not explicitly bound by a fidu-
ciary duty to the company or to its shareholders.304 This greater specter of
liability came to replace the traditional doctrine “that required the pres-
ence of a fiduciary relationship between the insider and the
shareholders.”305
In the Chilean context, NCG No. 278306 goes in the right direction by
requiring the Manual to spell out norms and procedures that are to be
applicable to a broad swath of people, whether independent of the securi-
ties issuer or not. However, despite this step forward, the approach used
by NCG No. 278 of specifically listing the individuals subject to the Man-
ual may have already been overcome by the realities of the securities mar-
ket, in which new (non-listed) stakeholders have emerged. In that sense,
SEC Rule 17j-1’s use of the notion of  “access persons”307 as individuals
that “ha[ve] access to information regarding any clients’ purchase or sale
of securities . . . .”308 could also serve as a useful guide to Chilean legisla-
tors, because it has the benefit of providing a conceptual definition, rather
than a strict enumeration.
B. A More Rational Description of the Prohibited Conducts
and Applicable Penalties
Sanctions indicated in the Manual include, besides those prohibiting
certain future conduct, a fine payable to the SVS equivalent to a percent-
age of the operation or equal to the “total amount of the profit obtained
or the loss avoided.”309 Comparatively, the U.S. system of civil penalties
for insider trading demands not only the disgorgement of the total amount
involved in the relevant transaction, whether undue profits or avoided
losses, but also the payment of up to treble damages.310
301. Sapp, supra note 32, at 3.
302. Gorman, supra note 34, at 478.
303. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
304. Sapp, supra note 32, at 6.
305. Gorman, supra note 34, at 479.
306. Superintendencia Valores y Seguros, Normal de Cara´cter General No. 278, Est-
ablece Obligacio´n de Contar con Manual de Manejo de Informacio´n [Establishes the Obliga-
tion to Approve an Information Management Manual] (Jan. 19, 2010) [hereinafter NGC No.
278], available at http://www.svs.cl/normativa/ncg_278_2010.php.
307. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A–1 (2012).
308. Id. § 275.204A–1(e)(1)(i)(A).
309. See NGC No. 270, supra note 293, at 3.
310. See Sapp, supra note 32, at 16.
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C. The Need for a Mandatory Code of Ethics to Prevent Insider Trading
Although the SVS’s current regulatory framework requires the prepa-
ration of a “Manual for the Management of Information of Interest for the
Market” citing the important aspects of confidentiality and disclosure of
internal corporate information,311 the obligation to approve a written
Code of Ethics within the regulated entity – as is the case in the U.S.– is
missing from the Chilean regulatory framework.312 The addition of such a
measure could promote an active self-regulatory approach in the Chilean
corporate world through the development of “codes of conduct” or “codes
of good practices”313 for corporate governance.
D. Insider Trading in the Context of Public Offerings
Despite the fact that Article 166 of the SMA creates a presumption
that a wide range of individuals possesses privileged information by virtue
of their position or relationship to a given company, the presumption still
lacks the breadth possessed by Rule 14e-3 of the 1934 Act. In fact, Article
166 of the SMA takes the same approach as NGC No. 278 of the SVS,
which requires regulated entities to enumerate the people who will be re-
sponsible for establishing and enforcing purchases or transfers, in their
Manual.314
By contrast, SEC Rule 14e-3 bans any person that is in possession of
material non-public information regarding the commencement of a tender
offer, whether acquired directly or indirectly, from trading in such compa-
nies’ securities. Unlike in Chile, prohibition in the U.S. centers on the is-
sue of access to material non-public information. In other words, the
rebuttable presumption of access that exists in Chilean law is treated as a
non-rebuttable presumption in the U.S. In addition, it is not necessary in
the U.S. that there be a violation of a fiduciary duty to invoke the rule;315
there need only have been substantial steps made towards a tender offer.
Furthermore, Rule 14e-3 is also an anti-tipping provision, banning certain
persons from communicating material non-public information regarding a
tender offer to any person under circumstances in which it is reasonably
311. NGC No. 278, supra note 306, at 1-2 (mentioning the following points that must be
incorporated in the Manual: (i) staff responsible for establishing and enforcing its provisions;
(ii) criteria and procedures applicable to the protection of information; (iii) prohibitions or
restrictions; (iv) mechanisms to resolve conflicts of interest; (v) disciplinary framework in
case of infractions; and (vi) mechanisms for the disclosure of the Manual to the public).
312. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A–1(a) (2012).
313. Wigodski & Zu´n˜iga, supra note 7, at 1.
314. NGC No. 278, supra note 306, at ¶ 4.
315. See, e.g., SEC v. Bakrie, Lit. Rel. No. 15834, 1998 WL 449686 (Aug. 6, 1998)
(describing a circumstance in which an insider revealed the existence of discussions surround-
ing the acquisition of another company to his friend, before the information became public,
prompting the friend to acquire shares in the target company. Ultimately, the acquisition was
not successful, but the insider was discovered, arrested, and paid a civil penalty before re-
turning to his country of origin).
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foreseeable that such communication will likely result in a violation of in-
sider trading rules. The anti-tipping provision applies to any insider of the
offeror and to any tipped individual.316 Specifically, the Rule pertains to
intentional tipping, not lapsus linguae.317 In Chile, by contrast, NCG No.
270 of 2009 requires the board of directors to “adopt appropriate mea-
sures to prevent . . . [confidential information] . . . from being disclosed to
persons other than those who, by reason of their office, position or activi-
ties within the corporation, must know such information, before the infor-
mation is communicated to the shareholders or the public.”318 It would be
highly advisable for Chile to remove the power to regulate tipping from
the board of directors and to directly empower the SVS to issue
mandatory rules in this regard.
Finally, U.S. mergers and acquisitions are often plagued by insider
trading abuses during the pre-announcement period.319 A 2006 compre-
hensive independent study320 found that 41 percent of companies that re-
ceived tenders for 100 percent takeovers exhibited abnormal and suspect
transactions in the days prior to the date when those transactions became
public. The study concluded that these unusual activities very likely in-
volved unlawful insider trading in transactions worth substantial amounts
of money, sometimes billions of dollars.321 This data—and the idea that
similar abuses could exist in Chile—present all the more motivation for
Chile to more aggressively regulate tipping practices.
E. Mandatory Black-Out Periods
SVS’s NCG No. 270 of 2009322 provides that each regulated entity
must specify in its respective “Manual for the Management of Information
of Interest for the Market”: (a) the corporate organ(s) that create and
apply the manual, (b) instructions related to the disclosure of transactions
performed by related entities and their security holdings, and (c) the exis-
tence of black-out or prohibition periods affecting “directors, managers,
administrators and main corporate officers, as well as entities directly con-
trolled by them or through third parties.”323 NCG No. 270 further estab-
316. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 4:3
317. See id. “Lapsus linguae” is defined as a “slip of the tongue” by the Merriam-Web-
ster Dictionary. Lapsus Linguae, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/lapsus%20linguae (last visited June 19, 2014).
318. NGC No. 270, supra note 293, at 3.
319. Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of James D. Cox, Brainerd
Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law).
320. Gretchen Morgenson, Signs of Insider Trading Match Surge in Mergers, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/your-money/27iht-mergers.26098
79.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
321. Illegal Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chair-
man, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
322. NGC No. 270, supra note 293.
323. Id. at 3.
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lishes that such limitations may consist of a total and permanent
prohibition of operations, a temporary prohibition for a period defined by
the board of directors, or a permanent trading prohibition for a deter-
mined period between the respective transactions.324 However, though the
SVS rule provides guidelines regarding the parameters of black-out or
prohibition periods, their implementation is merely optional for regulated
entities. Hence, there is a need to more strongly mandate this matter in
order to ensure actual, rather than aspirational, compliance with insider
trading rules in Chile.
U.S. law defines a blackout period as:
[A]ny period of more than 3 consecutive business days during which the abil-
ity of not fewer than 50 percent of the participants or beneficiaries under all
individual account plans maintained by the issuer to purchase, sell, or other-
wise acquire or transfer an interest in any equity of such issuer held in such an
individual account plan is temporarily suspended by the issuer or by a fiduci-
ary of the plan.325
If a valid corporate purpose is in fact served by the withholding of a mate-
rial fact, then persons who are “in the corporate trust” must not deal per-
sonally in the corporation’s securities during a period of non-disclosure.326
Such a restriction frequently applies with respect to retirement funds.327
Section 306 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act328 prohibits insider securities
transactions during pension fund blackout periods. The introduction of
this section was intended, in part, to prevent corporate officers and direc-
tors from selling off company stock during a time when employees were
prevented from selling company stock in their 401(k) retirement plans.329
A former SEC chairman described the situation more colorfully, stating
that investors were revolted by “[t]he spectacle of corporate insiders plun-
dering their own companies or selling their stock quietly in advance of a
looming collapse . . . .”330
When, as is the case of Chile, the regulatory framework rests on volun-
tary rather than mandated compliance, a real disincentive against insider
trading does not exist truly exist.
F. Compliance Programs
U.S. self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have internal regulatory in-
sider trading frameworks and are required to enforce member compli-
324. Id. at 3.
325. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 306(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7201(a)(4)(A) (2012).
326. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 69-70 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)).
327. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, §§ 12.1-.2.
328. Sarbanes-Oxley § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7201.
329. § 306(a)(1), id. § 7201(a)(1).
330. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 12.2 (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27
(2002)).
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ance.331 Individual SROs have the authority to impose fines, censure and
expel members, and assess costs, subject to the right to appeal to the
SEC.332 In the wake of the 1988 ITSFEA and its imposition of substantial
penalties, SROs and corporations developed even more robust internal
compliance programs.333
Professional firms, such as accounting and law firms, financial in-
termediaries, such as advisers and banks, and publicly held companies
should all focus on educating their employees of the rules and risks regard-
ing insider trading, on implementing procedures to help prevent and de-
tect abuses, and on adopting mechanisms to limit access to confidential
information.334 Furthermore, as previously discussed in Part II.A and II.C,
so-called “Chinese Walls” are designed to control the flow of material,
non-public information within firms. The SEC has taken positions on the
efficacy of particular companies’ Chinese Walls in a number of cases and
generally endorses their use in settlements.335 A more widespread intro-
duction of these walls would aid in containing the locus of inside
information.
G. Legislative Incorporation of Tipping
Some Chilean authors have criticized the SMA’s technique of punish-
ing insider trading.336 In their belief, the law hinges on a complex set of
conduct requirements, which, in certain circumstances, can create generic
and overbroad obligations such as the duties of abstention, custody, or
control (i.e., ensuring that employees or third parties did not engage in
banned conduct).337 Criticisms also point towards the absence of general
limitations on disclosure and non-recommendation or communication of
information,338 known in the United States as “tipping.”339
Some courts have determined that a tippee (the person receiving the
tip), in trading upon the information received, may breach his duty to the
investing public, though he has no legal duty or responsibility to the com-
pany in whose securities he is trading.340 Other courts have taken the al-
331. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rule Requiring
Consolidated Audit Trail to Monitor and Analyze Trading Activity (July 11, 2012), http://
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483188.
332. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 7.1.4.
333. See, e.g., Carlo V. di Florio, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examina-
tions, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, The Role of Compliance and Ethics in Risk Management
(Oct, 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch101711cvd.htm (referring to efforts
to consolidate “a culture of ongoing improvement.”).
334. See generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20,§§ 13.4-.7.
335. Id. § 13.5.2.
336. Va´squez Palma, Caso LAN, supra note 139, at 472.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See Prado Puga, supra note 112, at 248.
340. Id. at 59.
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ternative view that a tipper (the person giving the tip) must breach a duty
to the information source (e.g., an employer) in order to be liable.341 That
is, while some courts rely on the breach of a fiduciary duty between the
tipper and the corporation, others do not establish this requirement and,
thus, propose an expansive concept of tipping.
Given these considerations, the institution of tipping might become a
genuine contribution for the study of eventual legislative amendments to
the Chilean securities market. Crucial aspects in this regard would pivot
around the following ideas:
(a) Tipping should occur not only be deemed to have occurred in the
context of a “special relationship” between the inside trader (or tipper),
the innocent party, and the issuer, but also when there is “misappropria-
tion” of information. In this latter case, liability should arise when a per-
son trades on or tips material nonpublic information in breach of a
fiduciary duty to the information source. As a result, and in contrast to the
“special relationship” situation, the party on the other side of the trade
should be largely irrelevant to the question of liability, and the party
harmed should be the source who had a justifiable expectation of confi-
dence and loyalty.
(b) The concept of “insider” should cover not only an issuer, but also a
corporation’s employees, officers, directors, shareholders, and even a indi-
vidual shareholder, independent of amount of ownership.
(c) Formal collaboration or a conspiracy between the tipper and tippee
should not be required. For example, a tippee could merely be eavesdrop-
ping on the tipper.
H. “Short-Swing Trading”
In the U.S., Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act is a technical provision that
authorizes the recapture by a company of profits arising from short-swing
trading in equity securities of the company by certain insiders.342 The pro-
vision gives publicly held companies the right to recover any profit made
by an officer, director or controlling shareholder343 from purchase and
sales that occur within six months of each other.344 This Rule applies re-
gardless of whether the trader possessed any material nonpublic informa-
tion.345 Section 16(b) liability runs to the corporation, meaning that any
shareholder may file a derivative action on the corporation’s behalf if the
corporation itself does not bring a suit.346 This short swing trading provi-
sion was intended to protect the interests of the public against predatory
341. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 20, § 4.5.2.
342. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 13 (describing a controlling shareholder as a benefi-
cial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity security of the corporation).
343. WILLIAM H. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 24 (1968).
344. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 34, § 10:2.
345. Id.
346. PAINTER, supra note 343, at 15.
Spring 2014] Insider Trading and Other Securities Frauds 209
activities of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations
by preventing them from speculating in the stock of the corporations to
which they owe a fiduciary duty. It is a prophylactic measure – intent is
irrelevant, as is whether there was unfair use.347
Courts use the “lowest-in, highest-out” formula in these types of cases,
matching the lowest price of securities purchase with the highest price at
which they were sold to assure that the rule’s sting will be sufficient to
deter short-swing trading by insiders.348 Recoveries are, therefore, maxi-
mized under the statute, which is why Section 16(b) has acquired “quasi-
penal” overtones.349 Section 16(b) is similar in purpose to Rule 10b-5,
since it addresses the informational advantage of insider status. However,
Rule 10b-5 affixes liability only where actual misuse of material inside in-
formation is proven, whereas Section 16(b) is applied mechanically, irre-
spective of whether misuse of material inside information is shown.350 In
sum, the “Short-Swing Trading” formula could be a point of reference for
future legislative amendments directed at curbing insider trading in Chile.
The most important benefit that Chile could derive from the “Short-Swing
Trading” formula  lies in the introduction of the “lowest-in, highest-out”
metric. In fact, use of this model to calculate damages in insider trading
transactions would result in an improvement to the current situation, in
which a judge relies primarily on formulas based in tort law that are ill-
suited to the peculiarities of financial markets and financial transactions.
I. Inclusion of SEC’s Bounty Program
The SEC’s arsenal of investigative mechanisms is vast and includes
such measures as the oversight of securities markets through sophisticated
computer programs and investigations of regulated entities of their own
volition, upon a citizen’s request, and in cooperation with other govern-
ment agencies.351 The SEC also utilizes such tools as anonymous tips,
press information, and the “bounty program.”352 The bounty program per-
mits the SEC to allocate up to 10 percent of the fines collected for the
benefit of those who provided information conducive to the application of
penalties. The rewards provided under the bounty program are completely
discretionary and not subject to judicial review.353
347. Id. at 25.
348. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 14, 18.
349. PAINTER, supra note 343, at 26.
350. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 14.
351. See generally SEC Enforcement Actions Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last visited June 19, 2014)
(referencing examples of insider trading enforcement actions recently taken).
352. See Office of the Whistleblower Final Orders of the Commission,  U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited June 19, 2014) (listing recent
bounty payments made pursuant to SEC enforcement actions).
353. Sapp, supra note 32, at 18.
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This reward system could be a useful means of increasing insider trad-
ing enforcement, or simply decreasing incidence of insider trading, in
Chile. However, considering that the philosophical-juridical foundation of
this type of program is intimately tied to the Anglo-Saxon notion of citizen
enforcement for the compliance of law, the incorporation of such a pro-
gram into the Chilean civil law system might be a tough pill to swallow and
would require a thorough review and study of its feasibility and potential
benefits, particularly in light of the fact that civil jurisdictions do not ap-
prove of punitive damages, contingent fees, or other similar methods of
compensation.354
J. Reinforced Preventative Measures
A fast and easily implementable proposal would be to broaden the
scope and application of precautionary measures, focusing primarily on
access to corporate non-public information by unauthorized employees, in
order to avoid additional incidence of insider trading in conjunction with
the advent and increased implementation of new information technology
(e.g., websites, electronic mail, and social media).355
K. “No Fault” Prosecutions
Finally, Chile might benefit from a serious consideration of the “no
fault” agreements used by prosecutors in the US. Under these agreements,
the investigated party accepts, without the admission or denial of the alle-
gations made against the investigated person, certain administrative, civil
and/or criminal penalties that might arise from the facts under investiga-
tion.356 The SEC and Department of Justice rarely skimp on resources to
carry out their securities investigations and legal prosecutions, prompting
investigated parties’ eagerness to engage in these “no fault” prosecutorial
agreements. Because the SEC and DOJ preserve their legal powers to ob-
tain the defendants’ frozen assets, whatever their nature or location,357
investigated parties have an even further incentive to agree to such an
agreement. The U.S. “no fault” prosecutorial system seems to provide ad-
354. See Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States and Latin
America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 119, 148 (2005) (referring to the lack of acceptance of punitive damages and contingent
fees in Latin America).
355. See id. at 7-9, 14-15.
356. See, e.g., SEC v. Hirsch, Lit. Rel. No. 15176, 1996 WL 693855 (Dec. 4, 1996).
357. See, e.g., SEC v. Certain Purchasers of Call Options of Duracell International, Inc.,
Lit. Rel. No. 15045, 1996 WL 546472 (Sept. 16, 1996); Lit. Rel. No. 15250, 1997 WL 54807
(Feb. 10, 1997). In this case, based on SEC’s request and on the same day when SEC’s action
was presented, the court ordered the temporal freezing of the defendant’s assets. Unsurpris-
ingly, this action motivated the defendant to reach a prompt agreement with the SEC, ac-
cepting multimillion civil penalties for its  insider trading actions. The same outcome took
place in the case SEC v. Certain Purchasers of the Common Stock of CBI Industries, Inc., Lit.
Rel. No. 15020, 1996 WL 492277 (Aug. 22, 1996).
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vantages for all parties involved and is a system which could be replicated
in Chile, to the benefit of the Chilean securities market.
In sum, Chile’s securities regulatory framework could derive important
benefits from exploring and potentially adding the types of agreements,
procedures, and statutory provisions explored in Section VI to its menu of
insider trading enforcement mechanisms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The regulation of the use of privileged information in Chile has under-
gone important transformations over the last twenty years due to a variety
of factors. Chief among them are judicial cases of high public notoriety, as
well as an increase in the corporate governance standards required of the
country by the OECD.358 The concept of insider trading has similarly ex-
panded, but, more importantly, so has the acknowledgment that prosecut-
ing wrongful insider trading is fundamental to the creation of a
transparent and equal securities market for all participants.359 In keeping
with this trend, the Chilean Supreme Court has gradually lowered the
threshold for the determination of whether insider trading exists in a par-
ticular case. For example, proof of actual damages is no longer necessary.
The same court has decided that actual intent to use privileged informa-
tion is no longer required to ascertain a wrongful use of insider trading.360
The Chilean Supreme Court has quite clearly taken a huge step towards
establishing a modified form of strict liability in insider trading cases, well
beyond the explicit text of the current legislative framework.
However, further reform must occur. In the context of progressive reg-
ulation of insider trading in Chile, the courts, particularly, the Chilean Su-
preme Court, have played a pioneering and expansive role. Yet, in a
democracy, such reform should be left to the legislature, not the judiciary,
well-informed and well-intentioned as it may be. Accordingly, several key
obligations or restrictions identified by the SVS should be upgraded from
being voluntary to mandatory (e.g. black-out periods).
In the case of the United States, the prosecution of insider trading has
increased during the last several decades. This evolution is evidenced by
the expansion of insider trading liability to persons with a “derivate fiduci-
ary duty”361 and to individuals that may be remotely or unrelated to the
358. Reforma a Gobiernos Corporativos en Empresas Privadas [Reform to Corporate
Governance in Private Companies], LA TERCERA (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.latercera.com/
contenido/894_118457_9.shtml; Jorge Barrera, Reforma al Sistema de Empresas Pu´blicas, LA
TERCERA (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/ideas-y-debates/2013/09/
895-541879-9-reforma-al-sistema-de-empresas-publicas.shtml.
359. See PFEFFER URQUIAGA, supra note 148, at 12.
360. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 288 (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.]
[Supreme Court], 8 Marzo 2010, “Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros v. Cueto Plaza,
Juan,” Rol de la causa: 1044-2009 (Chile)).
361. Va´squez Palma, supra note 115, at 278.
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company362—a clear divergence from the former requirement of a fiduci-
ary relationship.
Chile would benefit most from avoiding crippling government inter-
vention, as may be present in the United States. Chile should resist segre-
gating certain activities related to the trading of securities (investment
banking, commercial banking, financial intermediation, financial services,
consumer services, etc.). A segregation of such activities would be analo-
gous to using topical medicines to treat an addiction, rather than adopting
a comprehensive therapy aimed at changing harmful practices.
Financial markets that function correctly are vital for a prosperous so-
ciety to exist. Hence, there is a need to protect financial markets from
both internal and external threats. When market agents behave in an ir-
regular manner, they end up contaminating the rest of the market, leaving
the door open for more stifling government intervention. The government
and the entrepreneurial sector have a key role in protecting financial mar-
kets, and this is true for both Chile and the United States. To this end, the
thriving Chilean financial market would benefit from some of the propos-
als to combat insider trading outlined in this paper.
362. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving a night
watchman who passed privileged information to a friend who later used it for his benefit).
